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Abstract
This paper shows how knowledge representation and reasoning techniques can
be used to support organizations in complying with the GDPR, that is, the new Eu-
ropean data protection regulation. This work is carried out in a European H2020
project called SPECIAL. Data usage policies, the consent of data subjects, and se-
lected fragments of the GDPR are encoded in a fragment of OWL2 calledPL (pol-
icy language); compliance checking and policy validation are reduced to subsump-
tion checking and concept consistency checking. This work proposes a satisfactory
tradeoff between the expressiveness requirements on PL posed by the GDPR, and
the scalability requirements that arise from the use cases provided by SPECIAL’s
industrial partners. Real-time compliance checking is achieved by means of a
specialized reasoner, called PLR, that leverages knowledge compilation and struc-
tural subsumption techniques. The performance of a prototype implementation of
PLR is analyzed through systematic experiments, and compared with the perfor-
mance of other important reasoners. Moreover, we show how PL and PLR can be
extended to support richer ontologies, by means of import-by-query techniques.
PL and its integration with OWL2’s profiles constitute new tractable fragments
of OWL2. We prove also some negative results, concerning the intractability of
unrestricted reasoning in PL, and the limitations posed on ontology import.
1 Introduction
The new European General Data Protection Regulation1 (GDPR), that has come into
force on May 25, 2018, places stringent restrictions on the processing of personally
identifiable data. The regulation applies also to companies and organizations that are
1http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5419-2016-INIT/en/pdf
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not located in Europe, whenever they track or provide services to data subjects that are
in the European Union.2 Infringements may severely affect the reputation of the viola-
tors, and are subject to substantial administrative fines (up to 4% of the total worldwide
annual turnover or 20 million Euro, whichever is higher). Therefore, the risks associ-
ated to infringements constitute a major disincentive to the abuse of personal data.
Given that the collection and the analysis of personal data are paramount sources of
innovation and revenue, companies are interested in maximizing personal data usage
within the limits posed by the GDPR. Consequently, data controllers (i.e. the personal
and legal entities that process personal data) are looking for methodological and tech-
nological means to comply with the regulation’s requirements efficiently and safely.
The European H2020 project SPECIAL3 is aimed at supporting controllers in com-
plying with the GDPR. SPECIAL is tackling several hard problems related to usability,
transparency and compliance, see [9, 6, 20] for an overview. In this paper, we focus
on SPECIAL’s approach to the representation of data usage activities and consent to
data processing, together with the associated reasoning tasks related to the validation
of data usage policies and compliance checking.
The management of the consent to data processing granted by data subjects plays
a central role in this picture. The GDPR is not concerned with anonymous data, nor
data that do not describe persons (like astronomical data). The other data (hereafter
called personal data) must be processed according to the legal bases provided by the
regulation. Some examples of such legal bases include public interest, the vital interests
of the data subject, contracts, and the legitimate interests of the data controller, just to
name a few.4 These legal bases are constrained by a number of provisos and caveats
that restrict their applicability.5 So, in practice, the kinds of personal data processing
that are most useful for data-driven business are almost exclusively allowed by another
legal basis, namely, the explicit consent of the data subjects.6 Thus, it is important
to encode consent appropriately, so as to record it for auditing, and give automated
support to compliance checking.
Also the controller’s usage of personal data must be appropriately represented and
stored, in order to fulfill the obligation to record personal data processing activities,7
and in order to verify that such activities comply with the available consent and with
the GDPR.
SPECIAL tackles these needs by adopting a logic-based representation of data us-
age policies, that constitutes a uniform language to encode consent, the activities of
controllers, and also selected parts of the GDPR. A logic-based approach is essential
for achieving several important objectives, including the following:
• strong correctness and completeness guarantees on permission checking and
compliance checking;
2Cf. Article 3 of the GDPR.
3https://www.specialprivacy.eu/
4Cf. Article 6 of the GDPR.
5Of particular relevance here are the data minimization principle introduced in Article 5, and the limita-
tions to the legitimate interests of the controller rooted in Article 6.1(f).
6Article 6.1(a)
7Cf. Article 30 of the GDPR.
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• ensuring the mutual coherence of the different reasoning tasks related to poli-
cies, such as policy validation, permission checking, compliance checking, and
explanations;
• ensuring correct usage after data is transferred to other controllers (i.e. inter-
operability), through the unambiguous semantics of knowledge representation
languages.
Some of SPECIAL’s use cases place challenging scalability requirements on reasoning.
During the execution of the controllers’ data processing software, each operation in-
volving personal data must be checked for compliance with the consent granted by the
data subjects. The frequency of such compliance checks may be significantly high, so
SPECIAL needs to implement the corresponding reasoning tasks in such a way that the
time needed for each check does not exceed a few hundreds of µ-seconds. We address
this requirement by designing a specialized reasoner for the policy language.
After recalling the notions about description logics and their properties, that will
be needed in the paper, our contributions will be illustrated in the following order.
• Section 3 shows how to encode usage policies and the relevant parts of the GDPR
with a fragment of SROIQ(D) (the logical foundation of OWL2-DL). The de-
tails of the encoding will be related explicitly to GDPR’s requirements. After-
wards, we formally define PL, that is, the fragment of SROIQ(D) used to
encode data usage policies.
• Section 4 is devoted to the complexity analysis of reasoning in PL. We consider
concept satisfiability and subsumption checking, that are at the core of policy
validation and compliance checking, respectively. We will show that unrestricted
PL subsumption checking is coNP-complete. However, under a restrictive hy-
pothesis motivated by SPECIAL’s use cases, subsumption checking is possible
in polynomial time. Tractability is proved by means of a specialized two-stage
reasoner called PLR, based on a preliminary normalization phase followed by
a structural subsumption algorithm. A preliminary account of this section has
been published in [5].
• Section 5 shows how to support richer ontology languages for the description of
policy elements. The vocabularies for policy elements are treated like imported
ontologies by means of an import by query (IBQ) approach, that can be imple-
mented with a modular integration of the specialized reasoner for PL with a rea-
soner for the imported ontology. We prove that this integration method is correct
and complete, and justify the restrictive assumptions on the imported ontologies,
by adapting and slightly extending previous results on IBQ limitations. More-
over, we show that under hypotheses compatible with SPECIAL’s application
scenarios, the external ontology can be compiled into a PL ontology, thereby
reducing the IBQ approach to plain PL reasoning.
• PL subsumption checking (which is the core of compliance checking) is exper-
imentally evaluated in Section 6. After describing the implementation of PLR
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and its optimizations, PLR’s performance is compared with that of other impor-
tant engines, such as Hermit [12] and ELK [19]. For this purpose, we use two
sets of experiments. The first set is derived from the pilots of SPECIAL that
have reached a sufficient development level, namely, a recommendation system
based on location and internet navigation information, developed by Proximus,
and a financial risk analysis scenario developed by Thomson Reuters. The sec-
ond batch of experiments is fully synthetic, instead, and contains increasingly
large policies and ontologies, in order to assess the scalability of PLR.
Section 7 concludes the paper with a final discussion of our results and interesting per-
spectives for future work. Related work is heterogeneous (declarative policy languages,
tractable description logics, IBQ methods) so we distribute its discussion across the
pertinent sections, rather than in a single dedicated section.
2 Preliminaries on Description Logics
Here we report the basics on Description Logics (DL) needed for our work and refer
the reader to [3] for further details. The DL languages of our interest are built from
countably infinite sets of concept names (NC), role names (NR), individual names (NI),
concrete property names (NF), and concrete predicates (NP). A signature Σ is a subset
of NC ∪ NR ∪ NI ∪ NF.8
We will use metavariables A,B for concept names, C,D for possibly compound
concepts, R,S for role expressions, a, b for individual names, and f, g for concrete
property names. The syntax of the concept and role expressions used in this paper is
illustrated in Table 1.
An interpretation I of a signature ΣI is a structure I = (∆I , ·I) where ∆I is a
nonempty set, and the interpretation function ·I , defined overΣI , is such that (i)AI ⊆
∆I if A ∈ NC; (ii) RI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I if R ∈ NR; (iii) aI ∈ ∆I if a ∈ NI; (iv) fI ⊆
∆I × ∆D if f ∈ NF, where ∆D denotes the domain of the predicates in NP.9 The
semantics of an n-ary predicate p ∈ NP is a set of tuples pD ⊆ (∆D)n. In this paper
we use ∆D = N and unary concrete predicates inℓ,u , where ℓ, u ∈ N, such that
in
D
ℓ,u = [ℓ, u]. To enhance readability we will abbreviate inℓ,u(f) to ∃f.[ℓ, u]. So an
individual d ∈ ∆I belongs to (∃f.[ℓ, u])I if, for some integer i ∈ [ℓ, u], (d, i) ∈ fI .
The third column of Table 1 shows how to extend the valuation ·I of an interpre-
tation I to compound DL expressions and axioms. GCI stands for “general concept
inclusion”. An interpretation I satisfies an axiom α (equivalently, I is a model of α)
if I satisfies the corresponding semantic condition in Table 1. When I satisfies α we
write I |= α. We will sometimes use axioms of the formC ≡ D, that are abbreviations
for the pair of inclusions C ⊑ D andD ⊑ C.
A knowledge base K is a finite set of DL axioms. Its terminological part (or TBox)
is the set of terminological axioms10 in K, while its ABox is the set of its assertion
axioms.
8Concrete predicates are deliberately left out due to their special treatment.
9We are assuming – for brevity – that there is one concrete domain. However, this framework can be
immediately extended to multiple domains.
10See Table 1.
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Name Syntax Semantics
SRIQ concept and role expressions
inverse R− {(y, x) | (x, y) ∈ RI} (R ∈ NR)
roles
top ⊤ ⊤I = ∆I
bottom ⊥ ⊥I = ∅
intersection C ⊓D (C ⊓D)I = CI ∩DI
union C ⊔D (C ⊔D)I = CI ∪DI
complement ¬C (¬C)I = ∆I \ CI
existential ∃R.C {d ∈ ∆I | ∃(d, e) ∈ RI : e ∈ CI}
restriction
universal ∀R.C {d ∈ ∆I | ∀(d, e) ∈ RI : e ∈ CI}
restriction
number (⊲⊳ n S.C)
{
x ∈ ∆I | #{y | (x, y) ∈ SI ∧y ∈ CI} ⊲⊳ n
}
(⊲⊳=≤,≥)
restrictions
self ∃S.Self {x ∈ ∆I | (x, x) ∈ SI}
SRIQ terminological axioms
GCI C ⊑ D CI ⊆ DI
role disj(S1, S2) SI1 ∩ S
I
2
= ∅
disjointness
complex R1 ◦...◦Rn ⊑ R RI1 ◦ . . . ◦R
I
n ⊆ R
I
role inclusions
SRIQ assertion axioms (a, b ∈ NI)
conc. assrt. C(a) aI ∈ CI
role assrt. R(a, b) (a, b)I ∈ RI
Other concept and role expressions
nominals {a} {a}I = {aI} (a ∈ NI)
universal U UI = ∆I ×∆I
role
concrete p(f1, .., fn) {x∈∆I | ∃~v∈(∆D)n. (x, vi) ∈ f
I
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and ~v ∈ p
D}
constraints
Other terminological axioms
disjointness disj(C,D) CI ∩DI = ∅
functionality func(R) RI is a partial function
range range(R, C) RI ⊆ ∆I × CI
Table 1: Syntax and semantics of some DL constructs and axioms.
If X is a DL expression or a knowledge base, then Σ(X) denotes the signature
consisting of all symbols occurring in X . An interpretation I of a signature ΣI ⊇
Σ(K) is a model of K (in symbols, I |= K) if I satisfies all the axioms in K. We say
that K entails an axiom α (in symbols, K |= α) if all the models of K satisfy α.
A pointed interpretation is a pair (I, d) where d ∈ ∆I . We say (I, d) satisfies a
concept C iff d ∈ CI . In this case, we write (I, d) |= C.
2.1 The description logics used in this paper
The logic SRIQ supports the SRIQ expressions and axioms illustrated in Table 1.
In a SRIQ knowledge base, in order to preserve decidability, the set of role axioms
should be regular and the roles S, S1, S2 simple, according to the definitions stated in
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[16]. Horn-SRIQ further restricts SRIQ GCIs as specified in [23]. For simplicity,
here we illustrate only the normal form adopted in [24], see Table 2.
C1 ⊓ C2 ⊑ D
∃R.C ⊑ D
C ⊑ ∀R.D
C ⊑ ∃R.D
C ⊑ ≤ 1 S.D
C ⊑ ≥ n S.D
C,C1, C2, D either belong to NC ∪ {⊥,⊤}, or are of the form ∃S.Self
S is a simple role [16]
Table 2: The Horn restriction of SRIQ GCIs (normal form)
Like all Horn DLs, Horn-SRIQ is convex, that is, K |= C0 ⊑ C1 ⊔C2 holds iff either
K |= C0 ⊑ C1 or K |= C0 ⊑ C2
The logic EL is a fragment of Horn-SRIQ that supports only atomic roles, ⊤, ⊓,
and existential restrictions. Supported axioms are GCIs and assertions. We will denote
with EL+ the extension of EL with ⊥ and range axioms. EL++ denotes the extension
of EL+ with concrete domains. Subsumption checking and consistency checking are
tractable in EL and EL+. The same holds for EL++ provided that concrete domains
have a tractable entailment problem and are convex, in the sense that |= p1(~f1) ∨ . . . ∨
pn(~fn) holds iff |= pi(~fi) holds for some i ∈ [1, n] [2].
The logicDL-lite is a fragment of Horn-SRIQ that supports only inverse roles, un-
qualified existential restrictions (i.e. concepts of the form ∃R.⊤), GCIs and assertions.
Moreover, complements (¬) are allowed on the right-hand side of GCIs. DL-liteHhorn
extends DL-lite by supporting ⊓ and role inclusions of the form R1 ⊑ R2. Subsump-
tion and consistency checking are tractable in both logics.
The logic SROIQ(D) supports all the constructs and axioms illustrated in Table 1.
It is the description logic underlying the standard OWL2-DL.
2.2 The disjoint model union property
A knowledge baseK such thatΣ(K)∩NI = ∅ enjoys the disjoint model union property
if for all disjoint models I and J ofK, their disjoint union I ⊎J = 〈∆I ⊎∆J , ·I⊎J 〉
– where P I⊎J = P I ⊎ PJ for all P ∈ NC ∪ NR ∪ NF – satisfies K, too ([3], Ch. 5).
This definition is extended naturally to the union
⊎
S of an arbitrary set S of disjoint
models. The disjoint model union property plays an important role in our results. It is
broken by the universal role and nominals. The main problem with nominals (and the
reason of the prerequisite Σ(K) ∩ NI = ∅) is that if I and J are disjoint, then for all
individual constants a ∈ NI, aI 6= aJ , so it is not immediately clear what aI⊎J should
be. The problem can be resolved for the constants occurring in ABoxes. Informally
speaking, it suffices to pick the constants’ interpretation from an arbitrary argument of
the union.11
11The following formalization of this idea generalizes a proof technique used in [14, Lemma 1].
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Definition 2.1 (Generalized disjoint union) For all sets of mutually disjoint interpre-
tations S and all I ∈ S, let
⊎I
S be the interpretation U such that:
∆U =
⋃
{∆J | J ∈ S}
PU =
⋃
{PJ | J ∈ S} for all P ∈ NC ∪ NR ∪ NF
aU = aI for all a ∈ NI .
If the terminological part of a knowledge base K has the (standard) disjoint model
union property, then the generalized union of disjoint models of K is still a model of
K:
Proposition 2.2 Let K = T ∪A, where T is the terminological part of K andA is its
ABox. If T has the disjoint model union property then for all sets S of mutually disjoint
models of K, and for all I ∈ S,
⊎I
S |= K.
Proof. Let S and I be as in the statement, and let U =
⊎I
S. Note thatΣ(T )∩NI = ∅,
otherwise the disjoint union of T ’s models would not be defined and T would not enjoy
the disjoint model union property, contradicting the hypothesis. For all interpretations
J , let J \NI denote the restriction of J to the symbols in NC∪NR∪NF (i.e. excluding
the individual constants in NI). Note that for all J ∈ S, J \NI is a model of T , because
Σ(T )∩NI = ∅. Therefore, by hypothesis,
⊎
{J \NI | J ∈ S} is a model of T . Clearly,⊎
{J \NI | J ∈ S} = (
⊎I
S)\NI; as a consequence, also
⊎I
S is a model of T . We
are only left to prove that U is a model of A. Consider an arbitrary assertion α ∈ A.
Since the models in S are disjoint, and the interpretation of constants in U ranges over
∆I , it holds that aU ∈ CU iff aI ∈ CI , (aU , bU) ∈ RU iff (aI , bI) ∈ RI , and
fU(aU ) = fI(aI) (f ∈ NF). Moreover, I is a model of A by hypothesis. It follows
immediately that U is a model of A.
2.3 Modularity and locality
A knowledge base K is semantically modular with respect to a signature Σ if each
interpretation I = (∆I , ·I) over Σ can be extended to a model J = (∆J , ·J ) of K
such that ∆J = ∆I and XJ = XI , for all symbols X ∈ Σ. Roughly speaking, this
means that K does not constrain the symbols of Σ in any way.
A special case of semantic modularity exploited in [14] is locality: A knowledge
base K is local with respect to a signature Σ if the above J can be obtained simply as
specified in the next definition.
Definition 2.3 (Locality) A knowledge base K is local with respect to a signature Σ if
each interpretation I = (∆I , ·I) over Σ can be extended to a model J = (∆J , ·J ) of
K by settingXI = ∅ for all concept and role namesX ∈ Σ(K) \ Σ.
Locality will be needed in Section 5, for the integration of PL knowledge bases with
imported ontologies. In particular, it is an essential ingredient of the completeness
proof for IBQ reasoning.
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3 Semantic Encoding of Data Usage Policies
SPECIAL’s policy languagePL – that is a fragment of OWL2-DL – has been designed
to describe data usage. Such descriptions can be exploited to encode: (i) the consent
to data processing given by data subjects, (ii) how the controller’s internal processes
use data, and (iii) selected parts of the GDPR that can be used to support the validation
of the controller’s internal processes. Moreover, PL is used to encode the entries of
SPECIAL’s transparency ledger, that is a log of data processing operations that can be
queried by:
• data subjects, in order to monitor how their personal data are used by the con-
troller and where they are transferred to;
• data protection officers, in order to audit the behavior of the controller;
• the controllers themselves, in order to monitor their own internal processes.
The aspects of data usage that have legal relevance are clearly indicated in several ar-
ticles of the GDPR and in the available guidelines. They are mentioned, for example,
in the specification of what is valid consent, what are the legal bases for processing,
what are the rights of data subjects, which aspects should be covered by national regu-
lations, and the obligation of controllers to keep a record of the processing operations
that involve personal data (see, inter alia, articles 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 7, 15.1, 23.2, 23.2,
30.1). See also the section titled “Records should contain” in the guidelines for SMEs
published on http://ec.europa.eu/justice/smedataprotect/index en.htm. That section de-
scribes how to fulfill the obligation to record the data subjects’ consent to process-
ing (Article 7) and, in particular, it specifies which pieces of information should be
recorded. According to the above sources of requirements, the main properties of data
usage that need to be encoded and archived are the following:
• reasons for data processing (purpose);
• which data categories are involved;
• what kind of processing is applied to the data;
• which third parties data are distributed to (recipients);
• countries in which the data will be stored (location);
• time constraints on data erasure (duration).
The above properties characterize a usage policy. SPECIAL adopts a direct encoding
of usage policies in description logics, based on those features. The simplest possible
policies have the form:
∃has purpose.P ⊓ ∃has data.D ⊓ ∃has processing.O ⊓ ∃has recipient.R ⊓
∃has storage(∃has location.L ⊓ ∃has duration.T ) .
(1)
All of the above roles are functional. Duration is represented as an interval of integers
[t1, t2], representing a minimum and a maximum storage time (such bounds may be
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required by law, by the data subject, or by the controller itself). The classes P , D,
O, etc. are defined in suitable auxiliary vocabularies (ontologies) that specify also the
relationships between different terms. The expressiveness requirements on the vocab-
ularies and their design are discussed later, in Section 5. Until then, the reader may
assume that the vocabularies are defined by means of inclusions A ⊑ B and disjoint-
ness constraints disj(A,B), where A,B are concept names. Such restrictions will be
lifted later.
If the data subject consents to a policy of the form (1), then she authorizes all of its
instances. For example ifD = DemographicData then the data subject authorizes – in
particular – the use of her address, age, income, etc. as specified by the other properties
of the policy.
It frequently happens that the data controller intends to use different data categories
in different ways, according to their usefulness and sensitivity, so consent requests
comprise multiple simple usage policies like (1) (one for each usage type). The in-
tended meaning is that consent is requested for all the instances of all those policies;
accordingly, such a compound policy is formalized with the union of its components.
The result is called full (usage) policy and has the form:
P1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pn (2)
where each Pi is a simple usage policy of the form (1). Symmetrically, with a similar
union, data subjects may consent to different usage modalities for different categories
of data and different purposes.
Example 3.1 A company – call it BeFit – sells a wearable fitness appliance and wants
(i) to process biometric data (stored in the EU) for sending health-related advice to
its customers, and (ii) share the customer’s location data with their friends. Location
data are kept for a minimum of one year but no longer than 5; biometric data are kept
for an unspecified amount of time. In order to do all this legally, BeFit needs consent
from its customers. The internal (formalized) description of such consent would look
as follows:
(∃has purpose.FitnessRecommendation⊓
∃has data.BiometricData ⊓
∃has processing.Analytics ⊓
∃has recipient.BeFit ⊓
∃has storage.has location.EU)
⊔
(∃has purpose.SocialNetworking⊓
∃has data.LocationData ⊓
∃has processing.Transfer ⊓
∃has recipient.DataSubjFriends ⊓
∃has storage.(∃has location.EU ⊓ ∃has duration.[y1, y5]) .
(3)
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Here y1 and y5 are the integer representation of one year and five years, respectively.
If “HeartRate” is a subclass of “BiometricData” and “ComputeAvg” is a subclass of
“Analytics”, then the above consent allows BeFit to compute the average heart rate of
the data subject in order to send her fitness recommendations. BeFit customers may
restrict their consent, e.g. by picking a specific recommendation modality, like “rec-
ommendation via SMS only”. Then the first line should be replaced with something
like ∃has purpose.(FitnessRecommendation⊓∃contact.SMS). Moreover, a customer
of BeFit may consent to the first or the second argument of the union, or both. Then
her consent would be encoded, respectively, with the first argument, the second argu-
ment, or the entire concept (3). Similarly, each single process in the controller’s lines
of business may use only biometric data, only location data, or both. Accordingly, it
may be associated to the first simple policy, the second simple policy, or their union.
In other words, (3) models the complete data usage activities related to the wearable
device, that may be split across different processes.
The usage policies that are actually applied by the data controller’s business pro-
cesses are called business policies and include a description of data usage of the form
(1). Additionally, each business policy is labelled with its legal basis and describes the
associated obligations that must be fulfilled. For example, if the data category includes
personal data, and processing is allowed by explicit consent, then the business policy
should have the additional conjuncts:
∃has legal basis.Art6 1 a Consent ⊓
∃has duty.GetConsent ⊓ ∃has duty.GiveAccess ⊓
∃has duty.RectifyOnRequest ⊓
∃has duty.DeleteOnRequest
(4)
that label the policy with the chosen legal basis, and model the obligations related
to the data subjects’ rights, cf. Chapter 3 of the GDPR. More precisely, the terms
involving has duty assert that the process modelled by the business policy includes
the operations needed to obtain the data subject’s consent (∃has duty.GetConsent) and
those needed to receive and apply the data subjects’ requests to access, rectify, and
delete their personal data.
Thus, business policies are an abstract description of a business process, highlight-
ing the aspects related to compliance with the GDPR and data subjects’ consent. Simi-
larly to consent, a business policy may be a unionBP1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ BPn of simple business
policies BPi of the form (1) ⊓ (4).
In order to check whether a business process complies with the consent given by
a data subject S, it suffices to check whether the corresponding business policy BP is
subsumed by the consent policy of S, denoted by CPS (in symbols,BP ⊑ CPS ). This
subsumption is checked against a knowledge base that encodes type restrictions related
to policy properties and the corresponding vocabularies, i.e. subclass relationships, dis-
jointness constraints, functionality restrictions, domain and range restrictions, and the
10
like. Some examples of the actual axioms occurring in the knowlede base are:
func(has purpose)
range(has data,AnyData)
Demographic ⊑ AnyData
Update ⊑ AnyProcessing
Erase ⊑ Update
disj(AnyData,AnyPurpose)
(recall that more general knowledge bases will be discussed later).
In order to verify that all the required obligations are fulfilled by a business process
(as abstracted by the business policy), selected parts of the GDPR are formalized with
concepts like the following. The first concept states that a business policy should either
support the rights of the data subjects, or concern anonymous data, or it should fall
under some of the exceptional cases mentioned by the regulation, such as particular
law requirements. The remaining requirement are not listed here (they are replaced
with an ellipsis):
(∃has duty.GetConsent ⊓ ∃has duty.GiveAccess ⊓ . . .) ⊔
∃has data.Anonymous ⊔
∃has purpose.LawRequirement ⊔ . . .
(5)
The second example encodes the constraints on data transfers specified in Articles 44–
49 of the GDPR:
∃has storage.has location.EU ⊔
∃has storage.has location.EULike ⊔ . . .
(6)
It states that data should remain within the EU, or countries that adopt similar data
protection regulations. The ellipsis stands for further concepts that model the other
conditions under which data can be transferred to other nations (e.g. under suitable
binding corporate rules). Please note that the above concepts constitute only a largely
incomplete illustration of the actual formalization of the GDPR, that is significantly
longer due to the special provisions that apply to particular data categories and legal
bases. The purpose of the above examples is conveying the flavor of the formalization.
Its usage is sketched below.
A business policy BP can be checked for compliance with the formalized parts of
the GDPR by checking whether the aforementioned knowledge base entails that BP is
subsumed by the concepts that formalize the GDPR.
Example 3.2 The following business policy complies with the consent-related obliga-
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tions formalized in (5) since it is subsumed by it:
(∃has purpose.FitnessRecommendation⊓
∃has data.BiometricData ⊓
∃has processing.Analytics ⊓
∃has recipient.BeFit ⊓
∃has storage.has location.EU ⊓
∃has legal basis.Art6 1 a Consent) ⊓
∃has duty.GetConsent ⊓ . . . all the remaining concepts in (4) . . .)
⊔
(∃has purpose.Sell ⊓
∃has data.Anonymous ⊓
∃has processing.Transfer ⊓
∃has recipient.ThirdParty) .
(7)
In particular, the two disjuncts of (7) are subsumed by the first two lines of (5), respec-
tively. Note that the second simple policy does not place any restrictions on location,
so it allows data to flow to any country, including those that do not enjoy adequate data
protection regulations. However, this is compliant with the GDPR because data are
anonymous.
The concepts in the range of existential restrictions may themselves be a conjunction
of atoms, interval constraints and existential restrictions. We have already seen in
policy (3) that has storage may contain a conjunction of existential restrictions over
properties has location and has duration. Another example, related to SPECIAL’s
pilots, concerns the accuracy of locations, that can be modelled with concepts like:
∃has data.(Location ⊓ ∃has accuracy.Medium) .
Based on the above discussion, we are now ready to specify PL (policy logic), a frag-
ment of OWL 2 that covers – and slightly generalizes – the encoding of the usage
policies and of the GDPR outlined above.
Definition 3.3 (Policy logic PL) A PL knowledge base K is a set of axioms of the
following kinds:
• func(R) where R is a role name or a concrete property;
• range(S,A) where S is a role and A a concept name;
• A ⊑ B where A,B are concept names;
• disj(A,B) where A,B are concept names.
12
Simple PL concepts are defined by the following grammar, where A ∈ NC R ∈ NR,
and f ∈ NF :
C ::= A | ⊥ | ∃f.[l, u] | ∃R.C | C ⊓ C .
A (full) PL concept is a union D1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Dn of simple PL concepts (n ≥ 1). PL’s
subsumption queries are expressions C ⊑ D where C,D are (full) PL concepts.
3.1 Discussion of the encoding
The formalization of policies as classes of data usage modalities addresses several
needs.
First, on the controller’s side, each instance of a process may slightly differ from
the others. For example, different instances of a same process may operate on data that
are stored in different servers, possibly in different nations (this typically happens to
large, international companies). The concrete data items involved may change slightly
(e.g. age may be expressed directly or through the birth date; the data subject may be
identified via a social security number (SSN), or an identity card number, or a pass-
port number). By describing storage location, data, and the other policy attributes as
classes, controllers can concisely describe an entire collection of similar process in-
stances. With reference to the above examples, classes allow to express that data are
stored “somewhere in the EU” and “in the controller’s servers”; both age and birthdate
fall under the class of demographic data; SSN and document numbers can be grouped
under the class of unique identifiers.
A second advantage of classes is that they support a rather free choice of granular-
ity. For example, the classes that model locations can be formulated at the granularity
of continents, federations, countries, cities, zip-codes, down to buildings and rooms.
Subsumption naturally models the containment of regions into other regions. A flex-
ible choice of granularity helps in turning company documentation into formalized
business policies, since it facilitates the import of the abstractions spontaneously used
by domain experts.
The third, and perhaps most important advantage is that classes facilitate the reuse
of consent. The GDPR sometimes allows to process personal data for a purpose other
than that for which the data has been collected, provided that the new purpose is “com-
patible” with the initial purpose.12 Compatibility cannot be assessed automatically, in
general, because it is not formalized in the regulation, and involves enough subtleties to
need the assessment of a lawyer. However, by expressing purposes as classes, one can
at least have the data subject consent upfront to a specified range of “similar” purposes.
Roughly speaking, the accepted class of purposes is like an agreement – between data
subjects and controllers – on which purposes are “compatible” in the given context.
Also expressing the other policy properties as classes is beneficial. As data subjects
consent to wider classes of usage modalities, the need for additional consent requests
tends to decrease; this may yield benefits to both parties, because:
1. data subjects are disturbed less frequently with consent requests (improved us-
ability, better user experience);
12See for example articles 5.1 (b) and 6.4.
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2. the costs associated to consent requests decrease. Consider that sometimes the
difficulties related to reaching out to the data subjects, and the concern that too
many requests may annoy users, make controllers decide not to deliver a service
that requires additional consent.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the class-based policy formalization adopted by SPE-
CIAL is essentially akin to a well-established policy composition algebra [8]. The al-
gebra treats policies as classes of authorizations (each policy P is identified with the
set of authorizations permitted by P ). In turn, authorizations are tuples that encode the
essential elements of permitted operations, such as the resources involved and the kind
of processing applied to those resources. Analogously, each PL policy like (1) denotes
a set of reifications of tuples, whose elements capture the legally relevant properties of
data usage operations.
3.2 Related policy languages
Logic-based languages constitute natural policy languages, because policies are knowl-
edge. First, note that policies encode declarative constraints on a system’s behavior,
that depend on metadata about the actors and the objects involved (e.g. ownership,
content categories), and an environment (as some operations may be permitted only
in certain places, or at specified times of the day, or in case of emergency). Semantic
languages and formats have been expressly designed to encode metadata, so standard
knowledge representation languages can represent in a uniform way both policy con-
straints and the metadata they depend on.
The second important observation is that – like knowledge and unlike programs –
every single policy is meant to be used for multiple, semantically related tasks, such as
the following:
• permission checking: given an operation request, decide whether it is permitted;
• compliance checking: does a policy P1 fulfill all the restrictions requested by
policy P2? (Policy comparison);
• policy validation: e.g. is the policy contradictory? Does it comply with a given
regulation? Does a policy update strengthen or relax the previous policy?
• policy explanation: explain a policy and its decisions.
The terse formal semantics of logical languages is essential in validating the correctness
of the policies themselves and the implementation of the above tasks, ensuring their
mutual coherence. Moreover, when data are transferred under agreed policies, it is
crucial that both parties understand the policies in the same way. So unambiguous
semantics is essential for correct interoperability, too.
In the light of the above observations, it is clear that knowledge representation
languages are ideal policy representation languages. Indeed, both rule languages and
description logics have already been used as policy languages; a non-exhaustive list is
[27, 17, 26, 18, 7]. As noted in [4], the advantage of rule languages is that they can ex-
press n-ary authorization conditions for arbitrary n, while encoding such conditions for
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n > 2 is challenging in DL. The advantage of DL is that all the main policy-reasoning
tasks are decidable (and tractable if policies can be expressed with OWL 2 profiles),
while compliance checking is undecidable in rule languages, or at least intractable, in
the absence of recursion, because it can be reduced to datalog query containment. So a
DL-based policy language is a natural choice in a project like SPECIAL, where policy
comparison is the predominant task.
The aforementionedworks on logic-based policy languages focus on access control
and trust management, rather than data usage control. Consequently, those languages
lack the terms for expressing privacy-related and usage-related concepts. A more seri-
ous drawback is that the main reasoning task in those papers is permission checking;
policy comparison (which is central to our work) is not considered. Both Rei and
Protune [18, 7] support logic program rules. We have already mentioned that if rules
are recursive, then policy comparison is generally undecidable; it is NP-hard if rules
are not recursive. This drawback makes such languages unsuitable to SPECIAL’s pur-
poses. Similarly, KAoS [26] is based on a DL that, in general, is not tractable, and
supports role-value maps – a construct that easily makes reasoning undecidable (see
[3], Chap. 5). The papers on KAoS do not discuss how the policy language is restricted
to avoid this issue.
The terms used as role fillers in SPECIAL’s policies are imported from well estab-
lished formats for expressing privacy preferences and digital rights, such as P3P (the
Platform for Privacy Preferences)13 and ODRL (the Open Digital Right Language).14
More general vocabularies will be discussed in Section 5. It is interesting to note that
P3P’s privacy policies – that are encoded in XML – are almost identical to simple PL
policies: the tag STATEMENT contains tags PURPOSE, RECIPIENT, RETENTION, and
DATA-GROUP, that correspond to the analogous properties of SPECIAL’s usage poli-
cies. Only the information on the location of data is missing. The tag STATEMENT is
included in a larger context that adds information about the controller (tag ENTITY)
and about the space of web resources covered by the policy (through so-called policy
reference files). All of these additional pieces of information can be directly encoded
with simple PL concepts. Similar considerations hold for ODRL. The tag RIGHTS as-
sociates an ASSET (the analogue of has data) to a PERMISSION that specifies a usage
modality. ODRL provides terms for describing direct use (e.g. play or execute), reuse
(e.g. annotate or aggregate), transfer (sell, lend, lease), and asset management opera-
tions (such as backup, install and delete, just to name a few). These terms provide a rich
vocabulary of fillers for the has processing property of SPECIAL’s policies. Also in
the case of ODRL, the tree-like structure of XML documents can be naturally encoded
with PL concepts.
4 Reasoning with PL
Some of the use cases of SPECIAL place challenging scalability requirements on com-
pliance checking. For example, if the applicable legal basis for processing is consent,
then storing personal data without permission is always unlawful, even if storage is
13http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P11
14https://www.w3.org/TR/odrl/
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temporary and for the sole purpose of running a batch process to discard the informa-
tion items that cannot be persistently stored. This means that the intense flow of data
produced by the communication infrastructure of Deutsche Telekom or Proximus (two
of SPECIAL’s industrial partners) must be filtered on the fly by checking the compli-
ance of each storage operation with the consent given by the involved customer. In
general, the frequency of compliance tests can be high enough to place real time re-
quirements on the compliance checker.
These scalability requirements have been addressed by finding a tradeoff between
expressiveness and efficiency. The language PL – that is rich enough to encode the
policies of interest – is also rather simple. Actually, PL would be a fragment of the
tractable description logic EL++ [2], if it did not support functional roles and interval
constraints (that constitute a non-convex datatype, while EL++ supports only convex
domains). The latter feature keeps PL outside the family of Horn Description Logics,
which include the tractable profiles of OWL2. As a consequence, no off-the-shelf
solutions are available to reason efficiently on PL concepts. Actually, we are going to
show that in PL unrestricted subsumption checking is coNP-hard.
However, we can exploit the structure of usage policies to make restrictive assump-
tions on PL concepts. Under such assumptions, we can prove that an approach ar-
ticulated in two stages – where first business policies are suitably normalized, then
compliance with consent policies is checked with a structural subsumption algorithm
– is correct, complete, and tractable. Its scalability will be experimentally assessed in
Section 6.
We start by laying out the formal description and the theoretical properties of nor-
malization and structural subsumption. In particular, this section deals with the cor-
rectness and completeness of the two-stages method, and discusses the computational
complexity of arbitrary subsumptions and of the restricted, tractable case. We first
prove the intractability of unrestricted subsumption in PL. The root of intractability
lies – as it should be expected – in the non-convex datatype, i.e. interval constraints.
Theorem 4.1 Deciding whether K |= C ⊑ D, where K is a PL knowledge base and
C,D are PL concepts, is coNP-hard. This statement holds even if the knowledge base
is empty and C is simple.
Proof. Hardness is proved by reducing 3SAT to the complement of subsumption. Let
S be a given set of clauses ci = Li1 ∨ Li2 ∨ Li3 (1 ≤ i ≤ n) where each Lij is a
literal. We are going to use the propositional symbols p1, . . . , pm occurring in S as
property names in PL concepts, and define a subsumption C ⊑ D that is valid iff S is
unsatisfiable. LetC =
(
∃p1.[0, 1]⊓. . .⊓∃pm.[0, 1]
)
andD =
⊔n
i=1
(
L˜i1⊓L˜i2⊓L˜i3
)
,
where each L˜ij encodes the complement of Lij as follows:
L˜ij =
{
∃pk.[0, 0] if Lij = pk ,
∃pk.[1, 1] if Lij = ¬pk .
The correspondence between the propositional interpretations I of S and the interpre-
tations J of C ⊑ D is the following.
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Given I and an arbitrary element d, define J = 〈{d}, ·J 〉 such that (d, 0) ∈ pJi iff
I(pi) = false , and (d, 1) ∈ p
J
i otherwise. By construction, (J , d) |= C, and I |= S
iff (J , d) 6|= D. Consequently, if S is satisfiable, then C ⊑ D is not valid.
Conversely, if C ⊑ D is not valid, then there exist J and d ∈ ∆J such that
(J , d) |= C ⊓¬D. Define a propositional interpretation I of S by setting I(p) = true
iff (d, 1) ∈ pJi . By construction (and since d does not satisfy D in J ), I |= S, which
proves that if C ⊑ D is not valid, then S is satisfiable.
We conclude that the above reduction is correct. Moreover, it can be clearly com-
puted in polynomial time. This proves that subsumption is coNP-hard even if the
knowledge base is empty and C simple.
Later on we will complete the characterization of PL subsumption by proving that it
is coNP-complete (Theorem 4.13).
The above intractability result does not apply to SPECIAL’s usage policies because
each simple usage policy contains at most one interval constraint, namely, a specifica-
tion of storage duration of the form ∃has storage.∃has duration.[ℓ, u]. We are going to
show that this property (actually, a slight generalization thereof) makes reasoning quite
fast. More specifically, it enables an efficient treatment of interval constraints based on
a suitable interval normalization method. Such normalization produces subsumption
queries that satisfy the following property.
Definition 4.2 (Interval safety) An inclusion C ⊑ D is interval safe iff, for all con-
straints ∃f.[ℓ, u] occurring in C and all ∃f ′.[ℓ′, u′] occurring in D, either [ℓ, u] ⊆
[ℓ′, u′], or [ℓ, u] ∩ [ℓ′, u′] = ∅.
Roughly speaking, interval safety removes the need of treating intervals like disjunc-
tions; it makes them behave like plain atomic concepts. Every inclusion can be turned
into an equivalent, interval safe inclusion, using the following method.
Definition 4.3 (Interval normalization, splitD(C)) For each constraint ∃f.[ℓ, u] in
C, let x1 < x2 < · · · < xr be the integers that occur as interval endpoints in D and
belong to [ℓ, u]. Let x0 = ℓ and xr+1 = u and replace ∃f.[ℓ, u] with the equivalent
concept
r⊔
i=0
(
∃f.[xi, xi] ⊔ ∃f.[xi + 1, xi+1 − 1]
)
⊔ ∃f.[xr+1, xr+1] . (8)
Then use distributivity of ⊓ over ⊔ and the equivalence ∃R.(C1 ⊔ C2) ≡ ∃R.C1 ⊔
∃R.C2 to move all occurrences of ⊔ to the top level. Denote the result of this interval
normalization phase with splitD(C).
Example 4.4 Let C = ∃f.[1, 9] ⊓ A and D = ∃f.[5, 12]. Then r = 1 and x0 = 1,
x1 = 5, x2 = 9 (12 falls outside [1, 9] and is ignored). According to (8), the concept
∃f.[1, 9] in C is replaced by the following union:
∃f.[1, 1] ⊔ ∃f.[2, 4] ⊔ ∃f.[5, 5] ⊔ ∃f.[6, 8] ⊔ ∃f.[9, 9] .
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1) ⊥⊓D ❀ ⊥
2) ∃R.⊥❀ ⊥
3) ∃f.[l, u]❀ ⊥ if l > u
4) (∃R.D) ⊓ (∃R.D′) ⊓D′′ ❀
∃R.(D ⊓D′) ⊓D′′ if func(R) ∈ K
5) ∃f.[l1, u1] ⊓ ∃f.[l2, u2] ⊓D ❀
∃f.[max(l1, l2),min(u1, u2)] ⊓D if func(f) ∈ K
6) ∃R.D ⊓D′ ❀ ∃R.(D ⊓ A) ⊓D′ if range(R,A) ∈ K, and neither A
nor ⊥ are conjuncts of D
7) A1 ⊓A2 ⊓D❀ ⊥ if A1 ⊑
∗ A′1, A2 ⊑
∗ A′2, and
disj(A′1, A
′
2) ∈ K
Table 3: Normalization rules w.r.t. K. Intersections are treated as sets (the ordering of
conjuncts and their repetitions are irrelevant).
Then, after applying distributivity, we obtain the concept splitD(C) (that is a full PL
concept):
(∃f.[1, 1]⊓A) ⊔ (∃f.[2, 4]⊓A) ⊔ (∃f.[5, 5]⊓A) ⊔ (∃f.[6, 8]⊓A) ⊔ (∃f.[9, 9]⊓A) .
The reader may easily verify that:
Proposition 4.5 For all PL subsumption queries C ⊑ D, splitD(C) is equivalent to
C and splitD(C) ⊑ D is an interval-safe PL subsumption query.
In general, splitD(C)may be exponentially larger thanC, due to the application of dis-
tributivity (e.g. this happens with the concepts C and D in the proof of Theorem 4.1).
However, as we have already pointed out, each simple policy has at most one, func-
tional concrete property so no combinatorial explosion occurs during interval normal-
ization. Accordingly – and more generally – the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4.6 Let C = C1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Cn be a PL concept, and suppose that for all
i = 1, . . . , n, the number of concrete properties occurring in Ci is bounded by a
constant c. Then, for all conceptsD, the size of splitD(C) is O(|C| · |D|
c).15
Note that C as a whole may still contain an unbounded number of interval constraints,
as n grows, because the bound c applies only to the individual disjuncts Ci.
The structural subsumption algorithm for PL’s subsumption queries accepts sub-
sumptions whose left-hand side is further normalized with respect to the rewrite rules
illustrated in Table 3. Such rules make contradictions explicit and merge functional
properties. They clearly preserve equivalence, as stated in the next proposition:
15We denote the size of the encoding of an expression E with |E|.
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Proposition 4.7 If C ❀ C′ then K |= C ≡ C′.
The proof is trivial and left to the reader. It is easy to see that concepts can be normal-
ized in polynomial time:
Lemma 4.8 Each PL conceptC can be normalized w.r.t. a given PL knowledge base
K in time O(|C|2 · |K|).
Proof.We take this chance to illustrate an algorithmwhich is similar to the one actually
used in the implementation of normalization. First C is parsed into a syntax tree T
(time O(|C|)) where each conjunction of n concepts is modelled as a single node with
n children. Then the tree is scanned in a depth-first fashion, looking for nodes labelled
with an existential restriction in order to apply rule 4). For each such node ν, ifR is the
involved role and func(R) ∈ K, then the previous siblings of ν are searched looking for
a node ν′ with the same roleR. If such a ν′ is found, then the child C′ of ν′ is replaced
with the intersection of C′ itself and the child of ν, then ν is deleted. This operation
(including the functionality test for R) takes time O(|K| + |C|) for each existential
restriction. Thus, the exhaustive application of rule 4) needs time O(|C| · |K|+ |C|2).
Rule 5) is dealt with similarly (but instead of merging children, the interval associated
to ν is intersected with the interval associated to ν′); the cost is the same. None of the
other rules adds any new existential restrictions, so rules 4) and 5) are not going to be
applicable again in the rest of the algorithm.
Next, rule 6) is applied by searching the tree T for existential restrictions whose
role R occurs in an axiom range(R,A) ∈ K. For each of such nodes, A is added to
the children as a new conjunct (if necessary). The cost for each existential restriction
is O(|K| + |C|) (where |C| is the cost of verifying whether the existential restriction
already containsA or⊥). So the exhaustive application of rule 6) is againO(|C| · |K|+
|C|2). The remaining rules can remove a range A only by substituting it with ⊥, so
rule 6) cannot be triggered again in the rest of the algorithm.
Finally, the nodes of T are visited in a depth-first fashion in order to apply rules 1),
2), 3), and 7).
Rule 7) is the most expensive. K is regarded as a labelled classification graph,
where each node is labelled with an atomic concept and with the disjointness axioms
in which that concept occurs. The disjointness test between A1 and A2 in rule 7) can
be implemented by a relatively standard linear-time reachability algorithm, that climbs
the classification graph from A1 and starts descending the classification whenever it
finds a node labelled with disj(A′1, A
′
2), searching for A2. In the worst case, this stage
involvesO(|C|2) searches (one for each pairA1, A2 in each conjunction), so its global
cost is O(|C|2 · |K|).
Finally, note that rules 1–3 do not need to be iteratively applied. If C contains an
empty interval [l, u] (l > u), or an occurrence of ⊥, at any nesting level, then surely C
can be rewritten to⊥. Therefore, it suffices to scan C once, looking for empty intervals
or ⊥.
Since the cost of rule 7 dominates the cost of the other rules, normalization can be
computed in time O(|C|2 · |K|).
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Normalized queries are passed over to a structural subsumption algorithm, called
STS (Algorithm 1). It takes as inputs a PL knowledge base K and an elementary PL
subsumption C ⊑ D:
Definition 4.9 (Elementary subsumptions) APL subsumptionC ⊑ D is elementary
(w.r.t. a PL knowledge base K) if both C and D are simple, C ⊑ D is interval safe,
and C is normalized w.r.t. K (i.e. none of the rules in Table 3 is applicable).
Algorithm 1: STS(K, C ⊑ D)
Input: A PL KB K and a PL subsumption C ⊑ D that is elementary w.r.t. K
Output: true if K |= C ⊑ D, false otherwise
Note 1: Below, we treat intersections like sets. For example, by C = C′ ⊓ C′′ we mean
that either C = C′ or C′ is a conjunct of C (possibly not the first one).
Note 2: ⊑∗ denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of {(A,B) | (A ⊑ B) ∈ K}.
1 begin
2 if C = ⊥ then return true ;
3 ifD = A, C = A′ ⊓ C′ and A′ ⊑∗ A then return true ;
4 ifD = ∃f.[l, u] and C = ∃f.[l′, u′]⊓C′ and l ≤ l′ and u′ ≤ u then return true ;
5 ifD = ∃R.D′, C = (∃R.C′) ⊓ C′′ and STS(K, C′ ⊑ D′) then return true ;
6 ifD = D′ ⊓D′′ , STS(K, C ⊑ D′), and STS(K, C ⊑ D′′) then return true ;
7 else return false ;
8 end
The full subsumption checking procedure (that applies to all PL subsumptions) is
called PL Reasoner (PLR for short). It is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: PLR(K, C ⊑ D)
Input: A PL KB K and a PL subsumption query C ⊑ D
Output: true if K |= C ⊑ D, false otherwise
1 begin
2 let C′ be the normalization of C w.r.t. K (with the rules in Table 3) ;
3 let C′′ = splitD(C
′) ;
// assume that C′′ = C1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Cm and D = D1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Dn
// check whether each Ci is subsumed by some Dj
4 for i = 1, . . . ,m do
5 for j = 1, . . . , n do
6 if STS(K, Ci ⊑ Dj) = true then skip to next i in outer loop;
7 end
8 return false
9 end
10 return true
11 end
PLR is correct and complete. We only state this result, whose proof is sketched in
[5], since we are going to prove it in a more general form for an extended engine that
supports more expressive knowledge bases (Section 5).
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Theorem 4.10 For all PL knowledge bases K and all PL subsumption queries q,
K |= q iff PLR(K, q) = true .
With this result, we can prove that subsumption checking in PL becomes tractable if
the number of interval constraints per simple policy is bounded by a constant c (recall
that in SPECIAL’s policies c = 1). First we estimate the complexity of PLR.
Lemma 4.11 For allPL knowledge basesK and allPL subsumption queriesC ⊑ D,
PLR(K, C ⊑ D) can be computed in time O(|C ⊑ D|c+1 + |C ⊑ D|2 · |K|), where c
is the maximum number of interval constraints occurring in a single simple concept of
C.
Proof. By Lemma 4.8 and Proposition 4.6, respectively, the complexity of line 2 of
PLR is O(|C|2 · |K|) and the complexity of line 3 is O(|C| · |D|c) = O(|C ⊑ D|c+1).
Now consider the complexity of the calls STS(K, Ci ⊑ Dj) in line 6. Each of them,
in the worst case, scans Ci once for each subconcept of Dj , searching for a matching
concept. Matching may require to solve a reachability problem on the hierarchy ⊑∗,
so the cost of each call is O(|Dj | · |Ci| · |K|). If we focus on the outer loop (lines 4–9)
then clearly each subconcept of D is matched against all disjuncts of C, in the worst
case. Then the overall cost of the outer loop is O(|D| · |C| · |K|). By relating these
parameters to the size of the query, it follows that the cost of the outer loop is bounded
by O(|C ⊑ D|2 · |K|). This dominates the cost of line 2. So we conclude that the
overall time needed by PLR in the worst case is O(|C ⊑ D|c+1 + |C ⊑ D|2 · |K|).
Tractability imediately follows from Theorem 4.10 and Lemma 4.11:
Theorem 4.12 Let c be an integer, and Qc be the set of all PL subsumptions C1 ⊔
. . .⊔Cn ⊑ D such that each Ci contains at most c interval constraints (i = 1, . . . , n).
Then deciding whether a query in Qc is entailed by a PL knowledge base K is in P.
We conclude this section by completing the characterization of the complexity of un-
restricted PL subsumptions. The following result, together with Theorem 4.1, proves
that PL subsumption is coNP-complete.
Theorem 4.13 Deciding whetherK |= C ⊑ D, where K is a PL knowledge base and
C,D are (simple or full) PL concepts, is in coNP.
Proof.We prove the theorem by showing that the complement of subsumption is inNP.
For this purpose, given a queryC ⊑ D, it suffices to choose nondeterministically one of
the disjuncts Ci in the left hand side of the query, and replace each constraint ∃f.[ℓ, u]
occurring in Ci with a nondeterministically chosen disjunct from (8). Call C
′
i the
resulting concept and note that it is one of the disjuncts in splitD(C). Therefore,K 6|=
C ⊑ D iff K 6|= splitD(C) ⊑ D iff, for some nondeterministic choice of C
′
i, K 6|=
C′i ⊑ D. Note that C
′
i ⊑ D is interval-safe by construction. Then this subsumption
test can be evaluated in deterministic polynomial time by first normalizing C′i w.r.t.
K and then applying STS, that is complete for elementary queries [5, Theorem 2].
It follows immediately that the complement of PL subsumption can be decided in
nondeterministic polynomial time, hence its membership in NP.
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5 Supporting General Vocabularies
SPECIAL has founded the “Data Privacy Vocabularies and Controls Community Group”
(DPVCG),16 a W3C group aimed at developing privacy-related vocabularies. The pur-
pose of this initiative is developing ontologies for the main properties of usage policies
and related GDPR concepts, with the contribution of a group of stakeholders that spans
beyond SPECIAL’s consortium. This group aims at developing upper ontologies, that
can be later extended to meet the needs of specific application domains.
We intend to put as few constraints as possible on the development of such stan-
dardized vocabularies, since it is difficult to predict the expressiveness needs that may
arise in their modeling – especially because standards usually change to include new
application domains and follow the evolution of the old ones. PL knowledge bases
are too simple to address this requirement. We already have evidence that it is useful
to have roles whose domain is a vocabulary term, such as the accuracy of locations
(cf. Section 3); so, in perspective, we should expect the ontologies that define privacy-
related vocabularies to include at least existential restrictions (that cannot be used in
PL knowledge bases, but are supported – say – by the tractable profiles of OWL2). It
is hard to tell which other constructs will turn out to be useful.
For the above reasons, we are going to show how to integratePL and its specialized
reasoner with a wide range of ontologies, expressed with description logics that can be
significantly more expressive than PL.
Our strategy consists in treating such ontologies – hereafter called external ontolo-
gies – as oracles. Roughly speaking, whenever STS needs to check a subsumption
between two terms defined in the external ontologies, the subsumption query is sub-
mitted to the oracle. In the easiest case, the oracle can be implemented simply as a visit
to the classification graph of the vocabularies. Of course this method, called import
by query (IBQ), is not always complete [14, 13]. In this section, we provide sufficient
conditions for completeness.
More formally, let K and O be two given knowledge bases. The former will be
called the main KB, and may use terms that are axiomatized inO, that plays the role of
the external ontology. For example, in SPECIAL’s policy modeling scenario,K defines
policy attributes – by specifying their ranges and functionality properties – while O
defines the privacy-related vocabularies that provide the fillers for policy attributes.
Therefore, in SPECIAL’s framework, K is a PL knowledge base, while O could be
formulated with a more expressive DL. The reasoning task of interest in such scenarios
is deciding, for a given subsumption query q = (C ⊑ D), whether K ∪ O |= q. Both
C and D are PL concepts that usually contain occurrences of concept names defined
in O.
SPECIAL’s application scenarios make it possible to adopt a simplifying assump-
tion that makes oracle reasoning technically simpler [14, 13], namely, we assume that
neither K nor the query q share any roles with O. This naturally happens in SPECIAL
precisely because the roles used in the main KB identify the sections that constitute a
policy (e.g. data categories, purpose, processing, storage, recipients), while the roles
defined in O model the contents of those sections, e.g. anonymization parameters, re-
16www.w3.org/community/dpvcg/
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lationships between recipients (like ownership, employment relations), relationships
between storage locations (e.g. part-of relations), and the like. This layered structure
does not require arbitrary alternations of roles coming from the main KB and from the
external ontologies. As a consequence, shared roles can be eliminated as follows:
Remark 5.1 The roles occurring in O can be used in policies as syntactic sugar. Any
concept of the form ∃R.C such that R occurs in O, can be eliminated from a query
by replacing it with a fresh atom A defined with an axiom A ≡ ∃R.C in the external
ontology, under the mild assumption that O’s language supports such equivalences.
The result satisfies the requirement that q and O should share no roles. The actual
restriction – that is not removed by the above transformation – is that in every concept
∃R.(. . . ∃S . . .), if R ∈ Σ(O) then also S must be in Σ(O). This is not an issue,
in SPECIAL’s application scenarios: as it has just been pointed out, role alternations
where R ∈ Σ(O) and S 6∈ Σ(O) are not required.
5.1 On the Completeness of IBQ Reasoning
The IBQ framework was introduced to reason with a partly hidden ontology O. For
our purposes, IBQ is interesting because instead of reasoning on K ∪ O as a whole,
each partition can be processed with a different reasoner (so, in particular, policies can
be compared with a very efficient algorithm similar to STS). The reasoner for K may
query the reasoner for O as an oracle, using a query language LO consisting of all the
subsumptions
A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Am ⊑ Am+1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ An (9)
such thatA1, . . . , An are concept names inΣ(O)∩NC. If n = m, then we stipulate that
the right-hand side of the inclusion is ⊥. We will denote with pos(O) all the queries to
O that have a positive answer, that is:
pos(O) = {q ∈ LO | O |= q} .
Remark 5.2 Each subsumption of the form (9) is equivalent to a concept (in)consis-
tency check of the form:
A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Am ⊓ ¬Am+1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬An ⊑ ⊥ . (10)
By [14, Theorem 2], consistency checks constitute a fully general oracle query lan-
guage, under the assumption that K and the query q share no roles with O.
The problem instances we are interested in are formally defined by the next defini-
tion.
Definition 5.3 (PL subsumption instances with oracles, PLSO) APL subsumption
instance with oracle is a triple 〈K,O, q〉 where K is a PL knowledge base (the main
knowledge base),O is a Horn-SRIQ knowledge base (the oracle), and q is a PL sub-
sumption query such that (Σ(K)∪Σ(q))∩Σ(O) ⊆ NC. The set of all PL subsumption
instances with oracle will be denoted by PLSO.
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The restrictions on K, O and q will be discussed in Section 5.5. We anticipate only
two observations. First, the restriction on the signatures is aimed at keeping the roles
ofO separated from those ofK and q, as discussed in the previous section. The second
obervation is that the important properties of O are the absence of nominals and the
following convexity property:
Definition 5.4 (Convexity w.r.t. LO) A knowledge base O is convex w.r.t. LO if for
all subsumptions q in LO of the form (9), q ∈ pos(O) iff there exists i ∈ [m + 1, n]
such that (A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Am ⊑ Ai) ∈ pos(O). A description logic is convex w.r.t. LO if
all of its knowledge bases are.
Accordingly, we requireO to be in Horn-SRIQ because, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the most expressive nominal-free and convex description logic considered so far
in the literature.
The next lemma rephrases the original IBQ completeness result [14, Lemma 1] in
our notation. Our statement relaxes the requirements on O by assuming only that it
enjoys the disjoint model union property (originally it had to be in SRIQ). The proof,
however, remains essentially the same.
Lemma 5.5 Let K andO be knowledge bases and α a GCI, such that
1. K and α are in SROIQ(D) without U , where D is the concrete domain of
integer intervals;
2. The terminological part of O enjoys the disjoint model union property;
3. The terminological part T of K is local w.r.t. Σ(O);
4. (Σ(K) ∪ Σ(α)) ∩Σ(O) ⊆ NC.
Then K ∪O |= α iff K ∪ pos(O) |= α .
Proof. We have to prove that under the above hypothesesK∪O |= α iffK∪pos(O) |=
α. The right-to-left direction is trivial since by definition O |= pos(O). For the other
direction, by contraposition, assume that K ∪ pos(O) 6|= α. We shall find a model N
of K ∪ O such that N 6|= α. Since α is of the form C ⊑ D, this means that for some
d¯ ∈ ∆N , d¯ ∈ (C ⊓ ¬D)N . The construction is similar to that used in [14, Lemma 1].
By assumption,K∪pos(O) has a model I such that I 6|= α, that is, there exists d¯ ∈
∆I such that d¯ ∈ (C ⊓ ¬D)I . Now we extend the interpretation I over Σ(K) ∪ Σ(α)
to a modelN of K ∪O.
We need some auxiliary notation: for each d ∈ ∆I , let lit(d, I) denote the set of
all the literals L in the language of O satisfied by d, that is,
lit(d, I) = {L | (I, d) |= L and either L = A or L = ¬A, where A ∈ NC ∩Σ(O)} .
Since I |= pos(O), it follows that for all d ∈ ∆I , O 6|=
d
lit(d, I) ⊑ ⊥ (cf. Re-
mark 5.2). Then, for all d ∈ ∆I , there exists a pointed interpretation (Jd, d) of Σ(O)
such that Jd |= O and lit(d,Jd) = lit(d, I). We may assume without loss of general-
ity that∆Jd ∩∆I = {d} and that ∆Jd ∩∆Jd′ = ∅ if d 6= d′.
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Let J be any of the above Jd and U =
⊎J {Jd | d ∈ ∆I}. By hypothesis 2 and
Proposition 2.2, U is a model ofO. Moreover, by hypothesis 3, U can be extended to a
modelM of T , by settingXM = ∅ for all predicatesX ∈ (Σ(K) ∪ Σ(α)) \ Σ(O).
Finally, letN be the interpretation such that:
∆N = ∆M (note that∆I ⊆ ∆M)
XN =
{
XI for all symbolsX ∈ (Σ(K) ∪ Σ(α)) \Σ(O)
XM for all symbolsX ∈ Σ(O) .
The next part of the proof proceeds exactly as in [14, Lemma 1], in order to show
that N |= K ∪ O. Note that by definitionM and N have the same domain and agree
on the symbols in Σ(O), therefore N is a model of O becauseM is. So one is only
left to prove thatN |= K. For this purpose, first it is proved that
(⋆) for all C in the closure17 of K and α, CN = CI ∪ (CM \∆I).
The proof of (⋆) makes use of hypotheses 1 and 4. Then, using (⋆) and the fact thatM
is a model of T , it can be shown thatM is a model ofK. Almost all details of the proof
of (⋆) andM |= K can be found in [14]. Here we only have to add the details for (⋆)
concerning interval constraints (that are not considered in [14]). Let C = ∃f.[l, u]. By
hypothesis 4, f ∈ (Σ(K)∪Σ(α)) \Σ(O). Then, by definition ofN andM, fN = fI
and fM = ∅. Consequently, CN = CI and CM = ∅, so (⋆) obviously holds.
For our formulation of this theorem, we only have to add the observation that (⋆)
implies also that d¯ ∈ (C ⊓ ¬D)I ⊆ (C ⊓ ¬D)N , thereforeN 6|= α.
Using the above lemma, we prove a variant of IBQ completeness for PLSO. The
locality requirement of Lemma 5.5 is removed by shifting axioms from K to O.
Theorem 5.6 For all problem instances π = 〈K,O, q〉 ∈ PLSO, let
K−O = {α ∈ K | α = range(R,A) or α = func(R) }
and let O+K = O ∪ (K \ K
−
O). Then
K ∪O |= q iff K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= q .
Proof. Since K ∪O = K−O ∪ O
+
K , it suffices to show that
K−O ∪ O
+
K |= q iff K
−
O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= q .
This equivalence can be proved with Lemma 5.5; it suffices to show that K−O , O
+
K and
q satisfy the hypotheses of the lemma. First note that K−O is a PL knowledge base
and O+K is a Horn-SRIQ knowledge base (because, by definition of PLSO, K is in
PL and O in Horn-SRIQ, and the axioms shifted from L to O+K can be expressed in
Horn-SRIQ, too). Both PL and Horn-SRIQ are fragments of SROIQ(D) without
U , therefore hypothesis 1 is satisfied by K−O and O
+
K . Moreover, both PL and Horn-
SRIQ enjoy the disjoint model union property, therefore hypothesis 2 is satisfied.
17Recall that the closure of a set of DL expressions S is the set of all (sub) concepts occurring in S .
25
Next recall that (Σ(K) ∪ Σ(q)) ∩ Σ(O) ⊆ NC holds, by definition of PLSO. Since
the axioms α ∈ K \ K−O (transferred from K to O
+
K) contain no roles (they are of the
form A ⊑ B or disj(A,B)), it follows that
(Σ(K−O) ∪ Σ(q)) ∩ Σ(O
+
K) ⊆ NC ,
that is, hypothesis 4 holds. A second consequence of this inclusion is thatK−O contains
only axioms of the form range(R,A) and func(A) such that R 6∈ Σ(O+K). They are
trivially satisfied by any interpretation I such thatRI = ∅. ThereforeK−O is local w.r.t.
Σ(O+K) and hypothesis 3 is satisfied.
5.2 Extending PL’s Reasoner with IBQ Capabilities
The integration of PLR reasoner with external oracles relies on the axiom shifting ap-
plied in Theorem 5.6. Accordingly, in the following, let K−O and O
+
K be defined as in
Theorem 5.6.
The next step after axiom shifting consists in replacing the relation ⊑∗ used by the
normalization rules and STS with suitable queries to the oracle. This change concerns
the normalization rules (Table 3) and STS. The new set of rules is illustrated in Table 4.
1) ⊥ ⊓D ❀ ⊥
2) ∃R.⊥❀ ⊥
3) ∃f.[l, u]❀ ⊥ if l > u
4) (∃R.D) ⊓ (∃R.D′) ⊓D′′ ❀ ∃R.(D ⊓D′) ⊓D′′ if func(R) ∈ K−
O
5) ∃f.[l1, u1] ⊓ ∃f.[l2, u2] ⊓D ❀ ∃f.[max(l1, l2),min(u1, u2)] ⊓D
6) ∃R.D ⊓D′ ❀ ∃R.(D ⊓A) ⊓D′ if range(R,A) ∈ K−
O
and
A,⊥ are not conjuncts of D
7) A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓An ⊓D ❀ ⊥ ifO
+
K
|= A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓An ⊑ ⊥
Table 4: Normalization rules for STSO . Conjunctions are treated as sets (i.e. the order-
ing of conjuncts is irrelevant, and duplicates are removed).
Hereafter,❀ denotes the rewriting relation according to Table 4. Clearly, the new rules
preserve the meaning of concepts, in the following sense:
Proposition 5.7 If C ❀ C′ then K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= C ≡ C
′.
If none of the new rules is applicable to a concept C, then we say that C is normal-
ized w.r.t. K and O. The notion of elementary inclusion is modified accordingly, by
requiring normalization w.r.t. both K and O.
Definition 5.8 A PL subsumption C ⊑ D is elementary w.r.t. K and O if both C and
D are simple, C ⊑ D is interval safe, and C is normalized w.r.t. K and O (using the
rules in Table 4).
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Then STS is integrated with the “oracle” O by replacing its line 3 as in the following
algorithm STSO. In the following, we call a subconcept “top level” if it does not occur
in the scope of any existential restriction.
Algorithm 3: STSO(C ⊑ D)
Input: An ontology O and a PL subsumption C ⊑ D
Output: true if O |= C ⊑ D, false otherwise, under suitable restrictions
1 begin
2 if C = ⊥ then return true ;
3 ifD = A and (A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ An ⊑ A) ∈ pos(O), where A1, . . . , An are the top-level
concept names in C then return true ;
4 ifD = ∃f.[l, u] and C = ∃f.[l′, u′]⊓C′ and l ≤ l′ and u′ ≤ u then return true ;
5 ifD = ∃R.D′, C = (∃R.C′) ⊓ C′′ and STSO(C′ ⊑ D′) then return true ;
6 ifD = D′ ⊓D′′ , STSO(C ⊑ D′), and STSO(C ⊑ D′′) then return true ;
7 else return false ;
8 end
Finally, the reasoner for general PL subsumptions with oracles can be defined as
follows:
Algorithm 4: PLRO(K, C ⊑ D)
Input: K and C ⊑ D such that pi = 〈K,O, C ⊑ D〉 ∈ PLSO
Output: true if K ∪O |= C ⊑ D, false otherwise
1 begin
2 construct K−
O
and O+
K
as defined in Theorem 5.6 ;
3 let C′ be the normalization of C w.r.t. K and O (with the rules in Table 4) ;
4 let C′′ = splitD(C
′) ;
// assume that C′′ = C1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Cm and D = D1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Dn
// check whether each Ci is subsumed by some Dj
5 for i = 1, . . . ,m do
6 for j = 1, . . . , n do
7 if STSO
+
K (Ci ⊑ Dj) = true then skip to next i in outer loop;
8 end
9 return false
10 end
11 return true
12 end
The rest of this section is devoted to proving the soundness and completeness of PLRO.
We will need a set of canonical counterexamples to invalid subsumptions.
Definition 5.9 Let C 6= ⊥ be a simple PL concept normalized w.r.t. K and O. A
canonical model of C (w.r.t. K and O) is a pointed interpretation (I, d) defined as
follows, by recursion on the number of existential restrictions. Hereafter we call a
subconcept of C “top level” if it does not occur within the scope of ∃ .
a. If C =
(dn
i=1 Ai
)
⊓
(dt
j=1 ∃fj .[lj , uj]
)
(i.e. C has no existential restrictions),
then let I = 〈{d}, ·I〉 where
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• AI = {d} if
(dn
i=1 Ai ⊑ A
)
∈ pos(O+K) ;
• fI = {(d, uj) | j = 1, . . . t} ;
• all the other predicates are empty.
b. If the top-level existential restrictions of C are ∃Ri.Di (i = 1, . . . ,m), then for
each i = 1, . . . ,m, let (Ii, di) be a canonical model ofDi. Assume w.l.o.g. that
all such models are mutually disjoint and do not contain d. Define an auxiliary
interpretation J as follows:
• ∆J = {d, d1, . . . , dm};
• AI = {d} if
(dn
i=1Ai ⊑ A
)
∈ pos(O+K) , where A1, . . . , An are the
top-level concept names in C; all other concept names are empty;
• fJ = {(d, u) | ∃f.[l, u] is a top-level constraint of C } ;
• RJi = {(d, di) | i = 1, . . . ,m} .
Finally let I be the union of J and all Ii, that is
∆I = ∆J ∪
⋃
i∆
Ii
AI = AJ ∪
⋃
iA
Ii (A ∈ NC)
RI = RJ ∪
⋃
iR
Ii (R ∈ NR ∪ NF) .
The canonical model is (I, d).
Note that each C has a unique canonical model up to isomorphism. The canonical
model satisfies K−O , O
+
K , and C:
Lemma 5.10 If C is a simple PL concept normalized w.r.t. K and O, and C 6= ⊥,
then each canonical model (I, d) of C enjoys the following properties:
a. I |= K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K);
b. (I, d) |= C.
Proof. By induction on the maximum nesting level ℓ of C’s existential restrictions.
If ℓ = 0 (i.e. there are no existential restrictions) then obviously (I, d) |= C by
construction (cf. Def. 5.9.a). The entailment I |= K−O holds because K
−
O contains
only range and functionality axioms, that are trivially satisfied since all roles are empty
in I. In order to prove the base case we are only left to show that I |= pos(O+K).
Suppose not, i.e. there exists an inclusion B1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Bm ⊑ A in pos(O
+
K) such that
d ∈ (B1⊓. . .⊓Bm)I but d 6∈ AI (where d is the only member of∆I ). By construction
of I, d ∈ BIj only if pos(O
+
K) contains
dn
i=1Ai ⊑ Bj for all j = 1, . . . ,m, where the
Ai are the top-level concept names in C. These inclusions, together with B1 ⊓ . . . ⊓
Bm ⊑ A, imply by simple inferences that
dn
i=1 Ai ⊑ Amust be in pos(O
+
K), too. But
then AI should contain {d} by definition (a contradiction). This completes the proof
of the base case.
Now suppose that ℓ > 0. By induction hypothesis (I.H), we have that all the
submodels (Ii, di) used in Def. 5.9.b satisfy Di. Then it is immediate to see that
28
(I, d) |= C by construction. We are only left to prove that I satisfies all axioms α in
K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K).
If α = func(R), then rewrite rules 4) and 5) make sure that C contains at most one
existential restriction for R, so J satisfies α. Since all Ii satisfy α by I.H., I satisfies
α, too.
If α = range(R,A), then rule 6) makes sure that for each top-level concept of the
form ∃R.Di in C, Di ≡ D′i ⊓ A. Then, by I.H., (Ii, di) |= A and, consequently, α is
satisfied by I.
Finally, if α is an inclusion in pos(O+K), then d satisfies it by the same argument
used in the base case, while the other individuals in ∆I satisfy α by I.H.
Another key property of the canonical models of C is that they characterize all the
valid elementary subsumptions whose left-hand side is C:
Lemma 5.11 IfC ⊑ D is elementary w.r.t.K andO, C 6= ⊥, and (I, d) is a canonical
model of C, then
K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= C ⊑ D iff (I, d) |= D .
Proof. (Only If part) Assume that K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= C ⊑ D. By Lemma 5.10.a, we
have I |= K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K), so by assumption C
I ⊆ DI . Moreover, by Lemma 5.10.b,
d ∈ CI ⊆ DI . Therefore (I, d) |= D.
(If part) Assume that (I, d) |= D. We are going to prove that K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |=
C ⊑ D by structural induction onD.
If D = A (a concept name), then d ∈ AI by assumption. Then, by construction
of I, there must be an inclusion
(dn
i=1Ai ⊑ A
)
∈ pos(O+K), where A1, . . . , An
are the top-level concept names of C. This implies that both |= C ⊑
dn
i=1 Ai and
pos(O+K) |=
dn
i=1 Ai ⊑ A hold, hence K
−
O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= C ⊑ D.
If D = D1 ⊓D2, then (I, d) |= Di (i = 1, 2), therefore, by induction hypothesis,
K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= C ⊑ Di (i = 1, 2), hence K
−
O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= C ⊑ D.
If D = ∃R.D1, then for some di ∈ ∆I , (d, di) ∈ RI and (Ii, di) |= D1, where
(Ii, di) (by construction of I) is the canonical model of a concept C1 occurring in a
top-level restriction ∃R.C1 of C. It follows that |= C ⊑ ∃R.C1 and (by induction
hypothesis)K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= C1 ⊑ D1, hence K
−
O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= C ⊑ D.
If D = ∃f.[ℓ, u], then for some u′ ∈ [ℓ, u], (d, u′) ∈ fI . By construction of I, C
must contain a top-level constraint ∃f.[ℓ′, u′], so by interval safety (that is implied by
the assumption that C ⊑ D is elementary), [ℓ′, u′] ⊆ [ℓ, u]. Then |= C ⊑ D.
Moreover, by means of canonical models, one can prove that interval safety makes the
non-convex logic PL behave like a convex logic.
Lemma 5.12 For all interval-safe PL subsumption queries σ =
(
C1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Cm ⊑
D1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Dn
)
such that each Ci is normalized w.r.t. K and O, the entailment K
−
O ∪
pos(O+K) |= σ holds iff for all i ∈ [1,m] there exists j ∈ [1, n] such that K
−
O ∪
pos(O+K) |= Ci ⊑ Dj .
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Proof. Let KB abbreviate K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K). By simple logical inferences, these two
facts hold: (i) KB |= σ iff KB |= Ci ⊑
⊔n
j=1 Dj holds for all i ∈ [1,m], (ii) if
KB |= Ci ⊑ Dj holds for some j ∈ [1, n], then KB |= Ci ⊑
⊔n
j=1 Dj . So we are
only left to show the converse of (ii): assuming that for all j ∈ [1, n], KB 6|= Ci ⊑ Dj
holds, we shall prove that KB 6|= Ci ⊑
⊔n
j=1 Dj .
By assumption and Lemma 5.11, the canonical model (I, d) of Ci is such that
(I, d) |= ¬Dj for all j ∈ [1, n]. Therefore (I, d) |= ¬
⊔n
j=1 Dj . Moreover, (I, d)
satisfies both KB and Ci by Lemma 5.10. Then I and d witness that KB 6|= Ci ⊑⊔n
j=1 Dj .
Now that the semantic properties are laid out, we focus on the algorithms. Roughly
speaking, the next lemma says that STSO
+
K decides whether the canonical model (I, d)
of C satisfies D.
Lemma 5.13 If C ⊑ D is elementary w.r.t. K and O, C 6= ⊥, and (I, d) is the
canonical model of C, then
STSO
+
K(C ⊑ D) = true iff (I, d) |= D .
Proof. By structural induction on D. If D = A (a concept name), then by definition
STSO
+
K(C ⊑ D) = true iff there exists an inclusion
dn
i=1 Ai ⊑ A in pos(O
+
K) such
that the Ai’s are the top-level concept names in C (cf. line 3 of Algorithm 3). By def.
of I, this holds iff d ∈ AI , that is, (I, d) |= D. This proves the base case.
If D = D1 ⊓ D2, then the lemma follows easily from the induction hypothesis
(cf. line 6 of Algorithm 3).
IfD = ∃R.D1, then STS
O
+
K(C ⊑ D) = true iff: (i) C has a top-level subconcept
∃R.C1, and (ii) STS
O
+
K(C1 ⊑ D1) = true (cf. line 5). Moreover, by definition
of I, (I, d) |= D holds iff fact (i) holds and: (ii’) (Ii, di) |= D1, where (Ii, di) is a
canonical model ofC1. By induction hypothesis, (ii) is equivalent to (ii’), so the lemma
immediately follows.
IfD = ∃f.[ℓ, u], then STSO
+
K(C ⊑ D) = true iff the following property holds:
C has a top-level subconcept ∃f.[ℓ′, u′] such that [ℓ′, u′] ⊆ [ℓ, u] (11)
(cf. line 4). We are only left to prove that (11) is equivalent to (I, d) |= D.
Property (11) implies (by construction of I) that (d, u′) ∈ fI and u′ ∈ [ℓ, u], that
is, (I, d) |= D.
Conversely, if (I, d) |= D, then there exists u′ ∈ ∆I such that (d, u′) ∈ fI and
u′ ∈ [ℓ, u]. Then, by construction of I, C must have a top-level subconcept ∃f.[ℓ′, u′].
By interval safety (that is implied by the hypothesis that C ⊑ D is elementary), the
fact that [ℓ′, u′] and [ℓ, u] have u′ in common implies [ℓ′, u′] ⊆ [ℓ, u]. Therefore, (11)
holds. This completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove that PLRO is correct and complete.
Theorem 5.14 Let 〈K,O, C ⊑ D〉 be any instance of PLSO. Then
PLRO(K, C ⊑ D) = true iff K ∪O |= C ⊑ D .
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Proof. D is of the formD1⊔ . . .⊔Dn. Let C1⊔ . . .⊔Cm be the conceptC′′ computed
by lines 2 and 3 of PLRO. We start by proving the following claim, for all i = 1, . . . ,m
and j = 1, . . . , n:
STSO
+
K(Ci ⊑ Dj) = true iff K
−
O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= Ci ⊑ Dj . (12)
There are two possibilities. If Ci = ⊥, then clearly K
−
O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= Ci ⊑ Dj and
STSO
+
K(Ci ⊑ Dj) = true (see line 2 of Algorithm 3), so (12) holds in this case. If
C 6= ⊥, then note that Ci ⊑ Dj is elementary w.r.t. K and O by construction of C′′
(which is obtained by splitting the intervals of the normalization of C w.r.t. K and O).
Then (12) follows immediately from lemmas 5.11 and 5.13.
By (12) and convexity (Lemma 5.12), we have that lines 5–11 of Algorithm 4 return
true iff K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= C
′′ ⊑ D. Moreover, C′′ can be equivalently replaced by
C in this entailment, by Proposition 5.7 and Proposition 4.5. The resulting entailment
is equivalent to K ∪O |= C ⊑ D by Theorem 5.6. It follows that Algorithm 4 returns
true iff K ∪O |= C ⊑ D.
PLRO runs in polynomial time, modulo the cost of oracle queries.
Lemma 5.15 PLRO(K, C ⊑ D) runs in time O(|C ⊑ D|c+1 + |C ⊑ D|2 · |K|)
using an oracle for pos(O+K), where c is the maximum number of interval constraints
occurring in a single simple concept of C.
Proof. Each query to the oracle triggered by the application of normalization rule 7
or by line 3 of STSO counts as one step of computation, according to the definition of
time complexity for oracle machines. Then, by the same arguments used in the proof
of Lemma 4.11, the computation of the normalization steps in lines 2 and 3 of PLRO
takes timeO(|C|2 · |K|+ |C| · |D|c), while the loops spanning over lines 5–9 take time
O(|D| · |C| · |K|). The lemma follows by expressing the size of C and D in terms of
|C ⊑ D| (cf. Lemma 4.11).
As a consequence of the above lemma, the classes of subsumption instances where c is
bounded can be decided in polynomial time, modulo the cost of oracle queries.
Definition 5.16 For all non-negative integers c, let PLSOc be the set of PLSO in-
stances 〈K,O, C ⊑ D〉 such that the maximum number of interval constraints occur-
ring in a single simple concept of C is bounded by c.
Theorem 5.17 For all c, PLSOc is in Ppos(O
+
K
).
Computing the consequences of O, in general, is intractable, although O is restricted
to Horn-SRIQ knowledge bases. For other Horn DLs, however – like the profiles
of OWL2 and their generalizations EL+ and DL-liteHhorn– subsumption checking is
tractable. By Theorem 5.17, the tractability of convex oracles extends to reasoning
in PL with such oracles. More precisely, it suffices to assume that membership in
pos(O+K) can be decided in polynomial time, since in that case P
pos(O+
K
) = P. This
is what happens when O is in EL+ and DL-liteHhorn , since the axioms shifted from K
to O (i.e. O+K \ O) can be expressed both in EL and in DL-lite, thereforeO
+
K is in the
same logic as O. This is formalized as follows:
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Definition 5.18 For all integers c ≥ 0, letPLSODLc be the set of instances ofPLSOc
whose oracle is in DL.
Corollary 5.19 For all c ≥ 0, PLSOEL
+
c and PLSO
DL−liteHhorn
c are in P.
18
It can also be proved that the normalization rules in Table 4 may be used as a policy
validationmethod, to detect unsatisfiable policies.
Theorem 5.20 Let 〈K,O, q〉 be a PLSO instance and C be a PL concept such that
Σ(C) ∩ Σ(O) ⊆ NC.
1. A PL concept C = C1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Cn is unsatisfiable w.r.t. K ∪O iff Ci ❀∗ ⊥ for
all i ∈ [1, n].19
2. Under the above hypotheses, PL concept satisfiability testing w.r.t. K ∪ O is in
Ppos(O
+
K
) (hence in P if O belongs to a tractable logic).
Proof. By Prop. 5.7 and Lemma 5.10,C is satisfiable w.r.t.K−O∪pos(O
+
K) iffCi ❀
∗ ⊥
does not hold for some i ∈ [1, n]. Moreover, by Theorem 5.6,
K−O ∪ pos(O
+
K) |= C ⊑ ⊥ iff K ∪O |= C ⊑ ⊥ .
Point 1 immediately follows. Next, note that normalization can be computed in poly-
nomial time using an oracle for pos(O+K). This can be shown with a straightforward
adaptation of the proof of Lemma 4.8 that takes into account the oracle queries in
rule 7 (the details are left to the reader). Then Point 2 follows from the complexity of
normalization and Point 1.
5.3 Related tractability and intractability results
Our tractability result for combinations ofPL knowledge bases and oracles in EL+ and
DL-liteHhorn extends the known tractable fragments of OWL2. The novelty of PL with
oracles in EL+ lies in the extension of EL with functional roles and non-convex con-
crete domains; unrestricted combinations of such constructs are generally intractable,
when the knowledge base – as in our subsumption instances – is nonempty and contains
unrestricted GCIs.
In particular, in the extension of EL with functional roles, subsumption checking is
EXPTIME-complete, in general [2]. A tractability result for empty TBoxes is reported
in [15, Fig. 4]; however, in the same paper, it is proved that even with acyclic TBoxes,
subsumption is coNP-complete.
The tractability of an extension of EL with non-convex concrete domains has been
proved in [15], under the assumption that the TBox is a set of definitions of the form
A ≡ C, where each A is a concept name and appears in the left-hand side of at most
one definition.
18The same holds if O is in EL++, since all the relevant properties of EL+ in this context, such as
tractability and convexity, hold for EL++, too.
19As usual,❀∗ denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of❀ .
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The overall tractability threshold for the DL-lite family can be found in [1]. The
results most closely related to our work are the following.
The data complexity of query answering raises at the first level of the polynomial
hierarchy if DL-liteHhorn is extended with functional roles. Knowledge base satisfiabil-
ity becomes EXPTIME-complete (combined complexity).
Under three syntactic restrictions [1, A1–A3] and the unique name assumption, all
the aforementioned reasoning tasks remain tractable.
The most expressive knowledge representation language enjoying a complete struc-
tural subsumption algorithm – to the best of our knowledge – is CLASSIC [11], that
supports neither concept unions (⊔) nor qualified existential restrictions (∃R.C). If
unions were added, then subsumption checking would immediately become coNP-
hard (unless concrete domains were restricted) for the same reasons why unrestricted
subsumption checking is coNP-hard in PL (cf. Theorem 4.1). On the other hand,
CLASSIC additionally supports qualified universal restrictions (that strictly generalize
PL’s range restrictions), number restrictions, and role-value maps, therefore it is not
comparable to PL. The complexity of the extensions of PL with CLASSIC’s con-
structs is an interesting topic for further research.
5.4 Compiling oracles into PL knowledge bases
Note that pos(O+K) might be compiled, i.e. computed once and for all, so as to re-
duce oracle queries to retrieval. After such knowledge compilation, PLRO could run
in polynomial time, no matter how complex O’s logic is, provided that the subset of
pos(O+K) queried by PLR
O (i.e. the part of pos(O+K) that should be pre-computed) is
polynomial, too.
This is not always the case. The conjunctions of classes
d
iAi that may possibly
occur in the left-hand side of subsumption queries are exponentially many in the sig-
nature’s size, and each of them may potentially occur in a query to the oracle. So, in
order to limit the space of possible oracle queries and reduce the partial materialization
of pos(O+K) to a manageable size, we have to limit the number of concepts that may
occur in the left-hand side of subsumption queries.
Fortunately, in SPECIAL’s use cases, the subsumption queries C ⊑ D that imple-
ment compliance checks have always a business policy on the left-hand side, and the
set of business policies of a controller is rather stable and not large. So the prerequisite
for applying oracle compilation is satisfied. We are further going to show that the or-
acle can be compiled into a plain, oracle-free PL knowledge base, therefore the IBQ
framework can be implemented with the same efficiency as pure PL reasoning.
We start the formalization of the above ideas by defining the restricted class of
problem instances determined by the given set of business policies BP.
Definition 5.21 For all sets of PL concepts BP, let PLSO(BP) be the set of all
〈K,O, C ⊑ D〉 ∈ PLSO such that C ∈ BP .
The first step of the oracle compilation consists in transforming business policies so as
to collapse each conjunction of concept names into a single concept name. We say that
the result of this transformation is in single-atom form, which is recursively defined as
follows:
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Definition 5.22 A simple PL concept C is in single-atom form if either
1. C is of the form (
dm
i=1 ∃fi.[li, ui]) ⊓ (
dk
i=1 ∃Ri.Ci), wherem, k ≥ 0, and each
Ci is in single-atom form, or
2. C is of the form A ⊓ (
dm
i=1 ∃fi.[li, ui]) ⊓ (
dk
i=1 ∃Ri.Ci) where m, k ≥ 0, and
each Ci is in single-atom form.
A full PL concept C1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Cn is in single atom form if C1, . . . , Cn are all in single
atom form.
The given business policies can be transformed in single atom form in linear time:
Proposition 5.23 For all finite sets of conceptsBP there exist a set of conceptsBP∗ in
single atom form, and a knowledge base O∗ that belongs to both EL and DL-litehorn ,
such that for all 〈K,O, C ⊑ D〉 ∈ PLSO(BP) there exists an equivalent problem
instance 〈K,O ∪O∗, C∗ ⊑ D〉 ∈ PLSO(BP∗), that is:
K ∪O |= C ⊑ D iff K ∪O ∪O∗ |= C∗ ⊑ D ;
Moreover, BP∗ andO∗ can be computed in time O(|BP|).
Proof. For all C ∈ BP , we obtain the corresponding concept C∗ by replacing each
intersection of multiple concept names in C with a single fresh concept name, whose
definition is included in O∗. More precisely, if C = C1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Cn then for all j =
1, . . . , n, replace each
Cj = (
nl
i=
Ai) ⊓ (
ml
i=1
∃fi.[li, ui]) ⊓ (
kl
i=1
∃Ri.Di)
such that n > 1 with
C∗j = B ⊓ (
ml
i=1
∃fi.[li, ui]) ⊓ (
kl
i=1
∃Ri.D
∗
i ) ,
where B is a fresh concept name and each D∗i is obtained by recursively applying the
same transformation toDi.
The knowledge base O∗ is the set of all the definitions B ≡ (
dn
i= Ai) such that B
is one of the fresh concepts introduced by the above transformations and
dn
i= Ai is the
intersection replaced by B.
Finally, let BP∗ be the set of concepts C∗ = C∗1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ C
∗
n obtained with the
above procedure. Clearly, by construction, K ∪ O ∪ O∗ |= C ≡ C∗, for all C ∈ BP.
Moreover,K ∪O ∪O∗ is a conservative extension of K ∪O. Therefore
K ∪O |= C ⊑ D iff K ∪O ∪O∗ |= C ⊑ D
iff K ∪O ∪O∗ |= C∗ ⊑ D .
Concerning complexity, BP∗ and O∗ can be computed with a single scan of BP; the
generation of the fresh concepts B, the replacement of
dn
i=Ai and the generation of
the definition for B take linear time in |Cj |. Therefore BP
∗ and O∗ can be computed
in time O(|BP|).
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By the above proposition, we can assume without loss of generality that BP is in single
atom form. Note that the ontologiesK and O, in a typical application scenario, do not
change frequently. So we can fix them and assume that the concepts in BP are already
normalized w.r.t.K andO. The set of problem instances with fixedK andO is defined
as follows:
PLSO(K,O,BP) = {〈K′,O′, C ⊑ D〉 ∈ PLSO | K′ = K, O′ = O, and C ∈ BP} .
The compilation of K and O into a single PL knowledge base is defined as follows:
comp(K,O) = K−O ∪ {A ⊑ B | (A ⊑ B) ∈ pos(O
+
K)} .
The correctness of oracle compilation is proved by the next theorem.
Theorem 5.24 LetK andO be two knowledge bases in PL and Horn-SRIQ, respec-
tively, and let BP be a set of PL concepts in single atom form and normalized w.r.t. K
andO. Then, for all 〈K,O, C ⊑ D〉 ∈ PLSO(K,O,BP),
PLRO(K, C ⊑ D) = PLR(comp(K,O), C ⊑ D) .
Proof. Since C is already normalized w.r.t. K and O by hypothesis, line 3 of PLRO
computes the identity function (i.e. C′ = C). It is easy to see that line 2 of PLR does
the same. First, note that the two versions of rules 4 and 6 (in Table 3 and Table 4) apply
to the same set of functionality and range axioms, since func(R) ∈ comp(K,O) ⇔
func(R) ∈ K−O and range(R,A) ∈ comp(K,O) ⇔ range(R,A) ∈ K
−
O (by definition
of comp). So there are no additional axioms in comp(K,O) that may trigger rules 4 or
6 in PLR. Second, since C is in single atom form by hypothesis, rule 7 of Table 3 never
applies. The other normalization rules are the same for PLRO and PLR. We conclude
that lines 2 and 3 of PLRO and PLR produce the same concept C′′ = splitD(C).
Consequently, the loops in lines 5–9 of PLRO and lines 4–8 of PLR return the same
result, too. To see this, it suffices to show that
STSO
+
K(Ci ⊑ Dj) = STS(comp(K,O), Ci ⊑ Dj) . (13)
The only difference between STSO
+
K and STS is in their line 3. The membership tests
executed by STSO
+
K in line 3 are all of the form (A1 ⊑ A) ∈ pos(O
+
K), because
Cj is in single atom form (this follows from the hypothesis that C is in single atom
form). For the same reason, STS in line 3 checks whether A1 ⊑∗ A. The two tests are
equivalent by definition of comp, therefore (13) holds and the theorem is proved.
Remark 5.25 Note that the size of comp(K,O) is at most quadratic in the size of
K ∪O, and that PLR runs in polynomial time if the number of interval constraints per
simple policy is bounded. Therefore, under this assumption – and after comp(K,O)
has been computed – subsumption queries can be answered in polynomial time. If O
uses expressive constructs fromHorn-SRIQ, then their computational cost is confined
to the compilation phase only, that is essentially a standard classification of O+K .
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A caveat on the size of comp(K,O) is in order, here. If the given set of policies
BP is not in single atom form, then O must be replaced by O ∪ O∗, as shown in
Proposition 5.23, where the size ofO∗ isO(|BP|). Therefore the size of comp(K,O∪
O∗) may grow quadratically with |BP|. This relationship shows the influence of BP’s
size on the complexity of the oracle compilation approach. So, unfortunately, oracle
compilation is not always possible. For example, in the application of PL to data
markets illustrated in the conclusions, we currently see no general criterion to restrict
the space of possible queries as required by the compilation method.
Remark 5.26 Using the compilation approach, the soundness and completeness of
PLR follow easily from the soundness and completeness of PLRO, according to which
K |= q holds if and only if PLR∅(K, q) = true. So it suffices to show that PLR(K, q) =
PLR∅(K, q). Note that comp(K, ∅) is simply the closure of K with respect to inclu-
sions (that is, comp(K, ∅) preserves the relation ⊑∗ associated to K). This fact and
Theorem 5.24, respectively, imply that
PLR(K, q) = PLR(comp(K, ∅), q) = PLR∅(K, q).
Similarly, the equality PLR(K, q) = PLR∅(K, q) and the correspondence between the
closure ⊑∗ of the inclusions in K and those in comp(K, ∅), immediately imply the
following corollary of Theorem 5.20:
Corollary 5.27 Let K be a PL knowledge base.
1. A PL concept C = C1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Cn is unsatisfiable w.r.t. K iff Ci ❀ ⊥ for all
i ∈ [1, n].
2. PL concept satisfiability w.r.t. K can be checked in polynomial time.
5.5 On the limitations posed on PLSO
In this section we briefly motivate the restrictions posed on PL subsumption prob-
lems with oracles (PLSO). We start with the requirements on the oracle. Recall that
O should be convex w.r.t. LO and should not use nominals. Convexity w.r.t. LO is
essential for tractability, as shown by the next result.
Theorem 5.28 If O is not convex w.r.t. LO and enjoys the disjoint model union prop-
erty, then there exists a PL knowledge base K such that deciding whether K ∪ O |=
C ⊑ D holds, given an interval-safe PL subsumption query C ⊑ D, is co-NP hard.
Proof. We are proving coNP-hardness by reducing 3SAT to the complement of sub-
sumption. By hypothesis, pos(O) contains an inclusion
A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓An ⊑ B1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Bm (14)
such that none of the inclusions A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ An ⊑ Bi belongs to pos(O), for i =
1, . . . ,m. Without loss of generality, we can further assume that A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ An ⊑
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B2 ⊔ . . .⊔Bm is not in pos(O) (if not, then discard some Bi from (14) until the right-
hand side is a minimal union entailed by A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ An). Now let K be the following
set of inclusions, where A′ and B′ are fresh concept names:
A′ ⊑ Ai (i = 1, . . . , n)
Bj ⊑ B
′ (j = 2, . . . ,m) .
Note that K ∪ O |= A′ ⊑ B1 ⊔ B′, by construction of K and (14). We are going to
represent the truth values true and false with B1 and B
′, respectively.
Let S be any instance of 3SAT, and let p1, . . . , pk be the propositional symbols
occurring in S. We assume without loss of generality that p1, . . . , pk do not occur in K
nor in O. Each positive literal pi is encoded by e(pi) = ∃pi.B1, while negative literals
¬pi are encoded by e(¬pi) = ∃pi.B
′. Then the negation of S is encoded by
D =
⊔
{e(L¯1) ⊓ e(L¯2) ⊓ e(L¯3) | L1 ∨ L2 ∨ L3 ∈ S} .
(where each L¯i is the literal complementary to Li). We claim that the entailment
K ∪O 6|=
(l
i
∃pi.A
′
)
⊑ D (15)
holds iff S is satisfiable (note that the above subsumption query is interval-free, hence
trivially interval safe). To prove the “only if” part, assume that (15) holds, that is, there
exists a pointed interpretation (I, d) such that I |= K ∪ O, d ∈
(d
i ∃pi.A
′
)I
and
d 6∈ DI . Since K ∪ O |=
(d
i ∃pi.A
′
)
⊑ (∃pi.B1) ⊔ (∃pi.B′) holds for each symbol
pi, there exists di ∈ ∆I such that (d, di) ∈ pIi and either di ∈ B
I
1 or di ∈ (B
′)I .
Construct a truth assignment σ for S by setting
σ(pi) =
{
true if di ∈ BI1 ,
false if di 6∈ BI1 (therefore di ∈ (B
′)I ) .
Since d 6∈ DI , each clause L1 ∨ L2 ∨ L3 of S contains a literal pi or ¬pi such that,
respectively, di ∈ BI1 or di ∈ (B
′)I , so σ satisfies the literal, by definition. It follows
immediately that σ satisfies S.
Conversely, suppose that S is satisfied by a truth assignment σ. We are going to
construct a pointed interpretation (I, d¯) that witnesses (15). Recall that neither A1 ⊓
. . . ⊓ An ⊑ B1 nor A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ An ⊑ B2 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Bm belong to pos(O). Then O has
two disjoint modelsM1 andM2 such that for some d1 ∈ ∆M1 and d2 ∈ ∆M2 ,
di ∈ (A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ An)
Mi (i = 1, 2)
d1 6∈ B
M1
1
d2 6∈ (B2 ⊔ . . . ⊔Bm)
M2 .
The union U = M1 ⊎M2 is still a model of O by hypothesis, and it can be extended
to a model J of K ∪O by setting:
∆J = ∆U
(A′)J = (A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ An)
J
(B′)J = (B2 ⊔ . . . ⊔Bm)
J .
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Finally, we extend J to the witness I as follows. First let ∆I = ∆J and choose any
d¯ ∈ ∆J . For all symbols pi define:
pIi = {(d¯, d1)} if σ(pi) = false ,
pIi = {(d¯, d2)} otherwise .
Note that d¯ belongs to (
d
i ∃pi.A
′
)
by construction, so we are only left to prove that
d¯ 6∈ DI . By assumption, each clause in S contains a literal L satisfied by σ. If L =
¬pi, then pIi = {(d¯, d1)}, therefore d¯ 6∈ (∃pi.B1)
I = e(L¯)I . Similarly, if L = pi,
then pIi = {(d¯, d2)}, therefore d¯ 6∈ (∃pi.B
′)I = e(L¯)I . It follows immediately that
d¯ 6∈ DI .
Note that the above theorem shows that reasoning can be intractable even if K and O
are fixed.
The requirement that nominals must not occur in oracles is needed for complete-
ness. Our algorithm PLRO– and the other IBQ methods where oracle queries are con-
sistency tests of the form (10), or the equivalent expressions of the form (9) – are
generalized by the following definition, that accounts for the shifting of axioms from
K to O.
Definition 5.29 Let PI be a set of problem instances of the form 〈K,O, q〉, where K
and O are knowledge bases and q is an inclusion. A shifting IBQ mechanism for PI
is a pair of functions (s, r) such that for all 〈K,O, q〉 ∈ PI:
1. s(K) ⊆ K ,
2. r(s(K), pos (O ∪ (K \ s(K))), q) = true iff K ∪O |= q .
Informally speaking, s determines which axioms are shifted from K to O, and r is the
IBQ reasoner that decides entailment using the modified knowledge bases. Shifting
IBQ mechanisms do not exist if O may use nominals.
Theorem 5.30 LetDL be a description logics that supports nominals and disjointness
axioms. Let PI be any set of problem instances that contains all 〈K,O, q〉 such that
K = ∅,O is aDL knowledge base, and q is an EL inclusion.20 There exists no shifting
IBQ mechanism for PI.
Proof. Let K = ∅ and q = ∃R.(A ⊓B) ⊓ ∃R.(A ⊓ B¯) ⊑ A′. Let
O1 = {disj(B, B¯)} ,
O2 = {disj(B, B¯), A ⊑ {a}} .
Note that both 〈K,O1, q〉 and 〈K,O2, q〉 belong to PI.
It can be easily verified that pos(O1) = pos(O2); in particular, the two sets contain
all the inclusions of the form A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Am ⊑ B1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Bn such that:
• either the inclusion is a tautology (i.e. some concept name occurs both in the
left-hand side and in the right-hand side),
20We use EL inclusions to strengthen our result, since they are a special case of PL subsumption queries.
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• or both B and B¯ occur in the left-hand side.
However, K ∪ O1 6|= q, while K ∪ O2 |= q. The latter fact holds because due to
the nominal {a}, both ∃R.(A ⊓ B) and ∃R.(A ⊓ B¯) should have the same role filler,
that cannot satisfy the disjoint concepts B and B¯ at the same time. It follows that q is
trivially satisfied because its left-hand side is equivalent to ⊥.
Now suppose that a shifting IBQ mechanism (s, r) for PI exists; we shall derive a
contradiction. By condition 2 of Definition 5.29,
r(s(K), pos(O1 ∪ (K \ s(K))), q) = false (16)
r(s(K), pos(O2 ∪ (K \ s(K))), q) = true . (17)
However,K = s(K) = ∅ and consequently:
r(s(K), pos(O1 ∪ (K \ s(K))), q) = r(∅, pos(O1), q)
= r(∅, pos(O2), q)
= r(s(K), pos(O2 ∪ (K \ s(K))), q)
which contradicts (16) and (17).
Remark 5.31 The above result complements the analogous negative result [13, Theo-
rem 4] that applies to knowledge bases K with infinity axioms (while PL knowledge
bases have the finite model property). On the other hand, [13, Theorem 4] covers also
more expressive oracle query languages.
The proof of the above negative result is based on the limited expressiveness of
the oracle query language LO . A similar consideration applies to the requirement that
Σ(O) may share only concept names with Σ(K) and Σ(q). Without this assumption,
PLRO is not complete. More generally:
Theorem 5.32 Let PI be a set of problem instances that contains all 〈K,O, q〉 such
that K = ∅, O is an EL knowledge base and q is an EL inclusion (possibly sharing
roles with O). There exists no shifting IBQ mechanism for PI.
Proof. Let K = ∅, q = (∃R.A ⊑ ∃S.A), O1 = ∅ andO2 = {q}. Note that
• pos(O1) = pos(O2) (both contain all and only the tautological inclusions of the
form (9));
• K ∪ O1 6|= q ;
• K ∪ O2 |= q .
Then the assumption that a shifting IBQ mechanism for PI exists leads to a contradic-
tion, by the same argument used in Theorem 5.30.
In the light of the above negative results, a natural question is whether an oracle query
language more expressive than LO would remove the need for the restrictions on nom-
inals and roles. Note that IBQ mechanisms for shared roles have already been intro-
duced in [13]. For a fragment of EL, there exists an IBQ algorithm that terminates
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in polynomial time. Nominals are not allowed, but shared roles are, under suitable
conditions.
In order to support more expressive oracle queries, PLRO and STSO should be
extensively changed, though. The proofs of the above negative results reveal that the
simple treatment of existential restrictions in STSO should be replaced with a more
complex computation, involving oracle queries, and it is currently not clear how sig-
nificantly such changes would affect the scalability of reasoning and the possibility
of compiling oracles into PL knowledge bases. Given that scalability is one of SPE-
CIAL’s primary requirements, and that there is no evidence that shared roles are needed
by SPECIAL’s application scenarios (cf. Remark 5.1), we leave this question as an in-
teresting topic for further research.
6 Experimental Assessment
In this section we describe a Java implementation of PLR and compare its performance
with that of other popular engines. We focus on PLR (as opposed to the more complex
PLRO) because SPECIAL’s application scenarios are compatible with the oracle com-
pilation into a PL knowledge base illustrated in Section 5.4. The implementation and
experimental evaluation of PLRO, that may be interesting in other applications of PL,
lie beyond the scope of this paper.
SPECIAL’s engine is tested on two randomly generated sets of inputs. The first
set is based on the knowledge base and policies developed for Proximus and Thomson
Reuters. Consent policies are generated by modifying the business policies, mimicking
a selection of privacy options from a list provided by the controller. This first set of
test cases is meant to assess the performance of the engines in the application scenarios
that we expect to arise more frequently in practice. The second set of experiments, that
makes use of larger knowledge bases and policies, is meant to predict the behavior of
the engines in more complex scenarios, should they arise in the future.
The implementation of PLR and its optimizations are described in the next sub-
section. Then Section 6.2 illustrates the test cases used for the evaluation. Finally,
Section 6.3 reports the results of the experiments.
6.1 Prototype Implementation and Optimization
PLR is implemented in Java and it is distributed as a .jar file. The reasoner’s class is
named PLReasoner, and supports the standard OWL APIs, version 5.1.7. The package
includes a complete implementation of PLR, including the structural subsumption al-
gorithm STS, and the preliminary normalization phases, based on the 7 rewrite rules
and on the interval splitting method for interval safety.
The interval splitting method has been refined in order to reduce the explosion of
business policies. The reason for refinements can be easily seen: if a business policy
contains interval [1, 10] and a consent policy contains [5, 10], then the method illus-
trated in (8) splits [1, 10] into the (unnecessarily large) set of intervals
[1, 1], [2, 4], [5, 5], [6, 9], [10, 10] ,
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that cause a single simple policy to be replaced with 5 policies. Note that for interval
safety the splitting [1, 4], [5, 10] would be enough. While (8) is convenient in the theo-
retical analysis – because it has a simpler definition and it does not increase asymptotic
complexity – a more articulated algorithm is advisable in practice. Here we only sketch
the underlying idea: each interval end point is classified based on whether it occurs only
as a lower bound, only as an upper bound, or both. A singleton interval is generated
only for the third category of endpoints, while the others are treated more efficiently.
In particular, in the above example, 1 and 5 occur only as lower bounds; this allows to
generate non-singleton sub-intervals that have 1 and 5 as their lower bound. Moreover,
10 occurs only as an upper bound; this allows to create a non-singleton sub-interval
where 10 is the upper bound. Accordingly, the refined splitting algorithm generates
only the two intervals [1, 4] and [5, 10].
Several other optimizations have been implemented and assessed. The correspond-
ing versions of PLR are described below:
PLR c
The normalization steps (lines 2 and 3 of PLR) are one of the most expensive parts
of the reasoner. In order to reduce their cost, two caches are introduced. The first
cache stores the business policies that have already been normalized w.r.t. K (line 2 of
PLR). In this way, the seven rewrite rules are applied to each business policy only once;
when the policy is used again, line 2 simply retrieves the normalized concept from the
cache. This optimization is expected to be effective in SPECIAL’s application scenarios
because only business policies need to be normalized, and their number is limited. So
the probability of re-using an already normalized policy is high, and the cache is not
going to grow indefinitly; on the contrary its size is expected to be moderate.
Similarly, a second cache indexed by the two policies C andD stores the concepts
splitD(C) already computed (thereby speeding up line 3 of PLR, that is, the interval
splitting step needed for interval safety).
PLR 2n, PLR c 2n
PLR 2n normalizes both C and D with the seven rewrite rules, before computing
splitD(C). Since the rewrite rules may merge and delete the intervals of D, this op-
timization potentially reduces the number of splitting points and, consequently, the
size of splitD(C). We denote with PLRc 2n the version of PLR that exploits both the
caches of PLR c and applies double normalization, as PLR pre.
PLR pre, PLR pre 2n
Sometimes the two normalization phases can be pre-computed. When the set of busi-
ness policies and the set of intervals that may occur in consent policies are known in
advance, the seven rules and interval splitting can be applied once and for all before
compliance checking starts. For example, intervals are available in advance when the
minimum or maximum storage time are determined by law, or when the duration op-
tions available to data subjects when consent is requested are specified by the data
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controller. This version of the engine is designed for such scenarios. The given set
of business policies is fully normalized before compliance checking starts, and stored
in the caches supported by PLR c. During compliance checking, lines 2 and 3 only
retrieve concepts from the caches. In this way the cost of a compliance check is al-
most exclusively the cost of STS. This version of PLR will be evaluated by measuring
compliance checking time only; preliminary normalizations are not included.
6.2 Test case generation
The first set of test cases is derived from the business policies developed for the pilots
of Proximus and Thomson Reuters; these policies will be denoted with PPXS and PTR
respectively.
In each compliance check PB ⊑ PC , PB is a union of simple business policies
randomly selected from those occurring in the pilots’ policy (PPXS or PTR). Since PB
describes the activity of a business process of the data controller, the random choice of
PB essentially corresponds to a random distribution of the controller’s data processing
activities (abstracted by the simple policies) across its business processes.
The consent policy PC is the union of a set of simple policies P
i
C (i = 1, . . . , n)
randomly selected from the pilots’ policy, and randomly perturbed by replacing some
vocabulary terms with a different term. The random selection mimicks the opt-in/opt-
out choices of data subjects with respect to the various data processing activities mod-
elled by the simple policies. Similarly, the random replacement of terms simulates the
opt-in/opt-out choices of the data subject w.r.t. each component of the selected simple
policies. More precisely, if the modified term occurring in P iC is a superclass (resp. a
subclass) of the corresponding term in the original business policy, then the data subject
opted for a broader (resp. more restrictive) permission relative to the involved policy
property (e.g. data categories, purpose, and so on).
In this batch of experiments, the knowledge base is always SPECIAL’s ontology,
that defines policy roles and the temporary vocabularies for data categories, purpose
categories, etc. The size and number of this batch of experiments is reported in Ta-
ble 5. The number of randomly generated business policies is higher in one case be-
cause PPXS has more simple policies than PTR: the ratio is 20 generated policies per
simple policy. Queries have been obtained by generating 100 consent policies for each
business policy. Table 5 reports also the average number of simple policies per gener-
ated policy and its standard deviation. The size of each policy is limited by SPECIAL’s
usage policy format: at most one interval constraint per simple policy, and nesting
depth 2.
In the second set of experiments, both the ontologies and PL subsumptions are
completely synthetic, and have increasing size in order to set up a stress test for veri-
fying the scalability of SPECIAL’s reasoner. Fifteen ontologies have been generated:
five for each of the three sets of parameters O1–O3 reported in Table 6. The same
table reports the parameters used to generate the PL concepts occurring in the queries,
according to two size specifications: P1 and P2.
Note that approximately half of the roles and concrete properties are functional,
and half of the roles have a range axiom. Ontologies have been generated by randomly
distributing classes over approximately log(#classes) layers. Then the specified num-
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Proximus (PXS) Thomson Reuters (TR)
Ontology
inclusions 186 186
disj 11 11
range 10 10
func 8 8
classification hierarchy height 4 4
Business policies
# generated policies 120 100
avg. simple pol. per full pol. 2.71 2.39
std. dev. 1.72 1.86
Consent policies
# generated policies 12,000 10,000
avg. simple pol. per full pol. 3.77 3.42
std. dev. 2.02 2.03
Test cases
# generated queries 12,000 10,000
Table 5: Size of the test cases inspired by the pilots
ber of disjointness axioms have been generated, by picking classes on the same layer.
Finally, about 2 · #classes inclusions have been created, mostly across adjacent lay-
ers, in such a way that no class became inconsistent. The ratio between the number of
inclusions and the number of classes is similar to the ratio that can be observed most
frequently in real ontologies, cf. [22, 21, 19].
We have generated 100 concepts of size P1 and 1000 of size P2, picking interval
endpoints from [0, 365] (one year, in days). Each set has been split into business and
consent policies (resp. 30% and 70% of the generated policies), that have been paired
randomly to generate test queries. The number of queries of size P1 generated for
each ontology is 50. Let #int be the maximum number of interval constraints per
simple policy after normalization w.r.t. the 7 rules21 (for a given business policy). The
number of queries of size P2 generated for each ontology and each business policy
with #int ≤ 5 is 10. The maximum number of queries for each ontology and each
#int > 5 has been limited to 40, in order to keep the length of the experimentswithin a
reasonable range. In this case, we maximized the number of different business policies
occurring in the selected queries.
For each ontology K, the business policies have been selected from the available
K-consistent policies. Furthermore, whenever possible, queries have been selected in
such a way that the number of positive and negative answers are the same. Table 6
illustrates the average size of the generated policies for each parameter setting. We
have not limited the number of interval constraints, in order to analyze the behavior of
PLReasoner as the number of intervals per simple policy grows (if it is not bounded
then PL subsumption query answering is coNP-hard). The maximum nesting level
occurring in the generated policies is approximately ⌈log2(max disjuncts)⌉.
21The reason for measuring #int after normalization is explained later.
43
Ontology size O1 O2 O3
classes 100 1,000 10,000
roles 10 50 100
concrete properties 10 25 50
func 10 37 75
range 5 25 50
avg. disj 3 31 298
avg. inclusions 211 2224 23418
avg. classification 8 10 14
hierarchy height
Concept size P1 P2
max #simple pol. 10 100
per full pol.
max #top-level inters. 10 20
per simple subconcept
max depth (nesting) 4 9
avg. #simple pol. 6.8 50.1
per full pol.
avg. depth 2.4 5
Simple policy size
avg. #intersections 10.6 25.8
avg. #intervals 3.7 9
Table 6: Size of fully synthetic test cases
6.3 Performance analysis
The experiments have been run on a server with an 8-cores processor Intel Xeon Silver
4110, 11M cache, 198GB RAM, running Ubuntu 18.04 and JVM 1.8.0 181, config-
ured with 32GB heap memory (of which less than 700MB have been actually used in
all experiments). We have not exploited parallelism in the engine’s implementation.
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Figure 1: Comparisons on small/medium policies
We start by illustrating the results for the test cases with small and medium poli-
cies. Figure 1 shows that PLR is faster than Hermit, over these test sets, even if no
optimization is applied. The size of the ontology affects the performance of Hermit
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more than PLR’s (cf. the results for O1, O2, and O3).
The good performance of PLR over PXS and TR had to be expected, given that the
policies involved in these test sets are SPECIAL’s usage policies, that by definition con-
tain at most one interval constraint per simple policy, of the form ∃has duration.[ℓ, u].
Let #int denote the maximum number of intervals per simple policy after applying
the rewrite rules, and recall that the size of splitD(C) may grow exponentially with
#int . We have not limited#int , while generating the synthetic policies in P1 and P2,
to see how the number of intervals affects the performance of PLR (recall that if #int
is unbounded, then PL subsumption is coNP-complete). We measured the value of
#int after applying the rewrite rules, because they can collapse and delete intervals,
thereby reducing the complexity of the subsequent interval splitting phase and the size
of splitD(C). After the application of the seven rules, the maximum #int over the
business policies occurring in P1’s queries is 9. Figure 1 shows that the potential com-
binatorial explosion of splitD(C) does not frequently occur with these policies. The
probability of splitting a single interval into many sub-intervals is evidently not high.
On the conttrary, a combinatorial explosion is clearly observable in the test sets with
large policies (P2); Figure 2 illustrates the results for the smallest synthetic ontologies
(O1).
1 2 3 4 5
102
103
104
# intervals per simple policy
m
il
li
se
co
n
d
s
P2-O1: Avg. time per subsumption query
Hermit
PLR
Figure 2: Impact of interval number per simple policy – large policies
Then we analyzed the effects of the optimizations described in Section 6.1. Their
effectiveness over small and medium policies is illustrated by Figure 3. The normaliza-
tion of consent policies (2n) brings no benefits with small policies (actually, it slightly
decreases the engine’s performance, compare PLR 2n with PLR, and PLR c 2n with
PLR c). Its benefits start to be visible with medium policies. The cache of normalized
policies (PLR c) is the best option on small policies. On medium policies, the combi-
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nation of the caches with the normalization of consent policies (PLR c 2n) is the most
effective optimization.
Over large policies (P2), the normalization of consent policies (2n) is essential to
mitigate the combinatorial explosion of splitD(C), as shown in Figure 4. The versions
of PLR that do not normalize D become impractical already for #int =3, while the
computation time of PLR 2n and PLR c 2n moderately increases. This behavior can be
explained by observing the effects of normalization on this test set: after the application
of the rewrite rules, the average number of intervals is about 10 times smaller, which
reduces the probability of an exponential growth of splitD(C).
Next, in Figure 5, we compare the best version of the engine over medium/large
policies (i.e. PLR c 2n) with Hermit. The optimizations delay the effects of combina-
torial explosions until#int =7. After this threshold, Hermit becomes faster.
Finally, we analyzed the effectiveness of business policy pre-normalization (pre).
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Recall that this approach is feasible in practice only if both the business policies and
the intervals that may occur in consent policies are known in advance, and do not
change frequently. The effects of pre-normalization on small and medium policies is
remarkable: PLR pre is approximately one order of magnitude faster than Hermit, as
shown in Figure 6. Over pilot-inspired tests, pre-normalization brings the average time
per subsumption query well below 500 µ-seconds.
The effects of pre-normalization quickly disappear over large policies. Figure 7
shows that the explosion of splitD(C) makes it necessary to apply also the normaliza-
tion of consent policies to delay combinatorial effects (cf. PLR pre 2n). However, for
#int =8, PLR pre 2n is slower than Hermit, so pre-normalization does not deal with
the combinatorial explosion better than PLR c 2n.
In order to assess the quality of PLR’s engineering, we compared it with the spe-
cialized engine ELK on the test case based on Proximus’ policies. ELK supports nei-
ther functionality axioms nor interval constraints, so it is generally unable to handle
PL subsumption problems; however Proximus’ policies make no use of intervals, and
never contain more than one expression ∃R.C with the same roleR. As a consequence,
ELK computes the correct answer on this test set. The average time per subsumption
query is 3.11 milliseconds; therefore all versions of PLR are significantly faster. In
particular, PLR pre is approximately one order of magnitude faster.
We have also considered Konclude, a reasoner that is very competitive on standard
benchmarks [25]. Konclude integrates a tableau algorithm with completion-based sat-
uration – for pay-as-you-go behavior – and adopts a wide range of optimizations. The
current version, however, is focussed on classification tasks; streams of PL subsump-
tions can be processed only at the cost of repeating classification for each query. This
prevents a fair comparison with Hermit and PLR.
7 Conclusions
We have introduced the description logic PL in order to formalize the data usage poli-
cies adopted by controllers as well as the consent to data processing granted by data
subjects. Checking whether the controllers’ policies comply with the available consent
boils down to subsumption checking between PL concepts. PL can also formalize
parts of the GDPR; then, by means of subsumption checking, one can automatically
check several constraints on usage policies such as, for example:
• Are all the required policy properties specified?
• Are all the required obligations specified?
• Is the policy compatible with GDPR’s constraints on cross-border data transfers?
PL supports interval constraints of the form ∃f.[ℓ, u] in order to model limitations on
data storage duration. This feature affects convexity, and places PL outside the space
of Horn DLs – including the tractable profiles of OWL2.
The frequency of compliance checks can be high, so PL has been designed to
address scalability requirements by making the language as simple as possible. De-
spite this, general subsumption checking in PL is coNP complete, due to the interplay
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of interval constraints and concept union. However, reasoning becomes tractable if
the number of interval constraints in each simple policy on the left of subsumption is
bounded by a constant, as it happens in SPECIAL’s usage policies, consent policies,
and in the formalization of the GDPR. Under this assumption, subsumption checking
can be split into a polynomial-time normalization phase and a subsequent subsumption
check that can be carried out by a fast, structural subsumption algorithm (STS).
The scalability of the complete algorithm (PLR) has been experimentally assessed.
Some of the test sets consist of realistic policies and ontologies, derived from SPE-
CIAL’s pilots. Such policies and ontologies are small, so we generated synthetic stress
tests, where policies and ontologies are significantly larger than what we expect in real
GDPR compliance scenarios. Our tests show that PLR is significantly faster than Her-
mit on small and medium policies. Moreover, PLR’s performance can be improved by
caching normalized policies (PLRc). With this solution, PLR takes around 500µ sec-
onds per subsumption check, over the test sets inspired by SPECIAL’s pilots (PXS and
TR). By pre-normalizing business policies (PLRpre), the average cost per subsumption
check can be further reduced to 333µsec (PXS) and 487µsec (TR).
Over large policies (P2), the probability of observing a combinatorial explosion
during interval splitting grows, and the performance of PLR exhibits an exponential
decrease as #int (the average number of intervals per simple policy measured after
applying the seven rewrite rules) increases. This phenomenon is unavoidable, unless
P = NP, because PL subsumption checking is coNP-hard if #int is unrestricted.
However, by normalizing also consent policies, combinatorial effects are mitigated,
and PLRc 2n turns out to be faster than Hermit for#int < 8.
In perspective, the expressiveness needed to encode the vocabularies of data cat-
egories, purposes, recipients, etc. is going to exceed the capabilities of PL. For this
reason, we have shown how to integrate the compliance checking method based on
PLR with reasoners for logics more expressive than PL. The integration is based on
the import by query approach. If the “external” ontology O that defines vocabulary
terms is in Horn-SRIQ, and if the main knowledge base K and the given subsump-
tion query share only concept names with O, then algorithm PLRO – an adaptation of
PLR that calls a reasoner for O – is sound and complete. If O additionally belongs
to a tractable DL, then subsumption checking is tractable in the IBQ framework, too.
The restriction on roles can be partly lifted by allowing queries to mention O’s roles,
provided that if R ∈ Σ(O), then the existential restrictions ∃R.C may contain only
roles in Σ(O).
We have also illustrated a different implementation strategy, based on a pre-com-
pilation of K and O into a single PL knowledge base comp(K,O), whose size is
polynomial in the size of K ∪ O and in the number of business policies. Compliance
checks are computed in polynomial time, after compilation, even if O belongs to an
intractable logic. Moreover, pre-compilation allows to exploit the implementation of
PLR, whose scalability has been assessed in Section 6. This approach works well in
SPECIAL’s use cases because the number of business policies is usually small, and
K, O, and the business policies are relatively stable and persistent. Unfortunately, the
above assumptions cannot be made in general, for all potential applications of PL.
Such applications include also the representation of licenses, which are a funda-
mental element of data markets. The application context is in some respect analogous
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to SPECIAL’s: PL concepts should encode the usage restrictions that apply to datasets,
multimedia content, and so on. In this case, however, the policies that can be reason-
ably assumed to belong to a limited set are those associated to sellers, that occur on
the right-hand side of subsumptions, while the left-hand side can hardly be restricted.
This hinders the compilation-based approach, and may require a direct implementa-
tion of PLRO, that is, the general IBQ reasoner for PL. Such implementation and its
experimental assessment are interesting topics for further research.
PL can also naturally encode electronic health records (EHRs). In this case, the
top-level properties of PL queries encode the sections of EHRs – according, say, to the
HL7 standard – while some of the sections’ contents can be specified with SNOMED
terms. The IBQ framework allows to process PL queries with PLRO, and reduce the
cost of SNOMED to oracle calls, consisting of linear time visits to its classification
graph. The efficiency of the structural subsumption reasoner is very promising in this
context, that is challenging for all engines due to the remarkable size of SNOMED. We
plan to try PLRO to increase the performance of the secure view construction reported
in [10].
The simplicity of PLR makes it possible to embed PL reasoning in objects with
limited scripting capabilities. For example, one of SPECIAL’s partners has programmed
PL compliance checking as a smart contract in an Ethereum blockchain. In this way,
the creation of new entries in the blockchain is subject to compliance with a specified
policy.
SPECIAL’s deliverables comprise dashboards for controllers, data subjects, and
data protection officers. We are going to support these interfaces by developing ex-
planation algorithms for helping users in understanding policies and their decisions.
The idea is leveraging the simple structure of PL concepts and axioms to generate
high-level, user-friendly explanations.
On the theoretical side, PL and its combination with EL+ and DL-liteHhorn consti-
tute new tractable fragments of OWL2. The negative result on oracles with nominals
(Theorem 5.30) extends a result of [13] to logics that (like PL) enjoy the finite model
property, and to IBQ mechanism where the axioms of the main knowledge base K may
be shifted to the imported ontologyO.
Further interesting topics for future work include: an analysis of the effects of
dropping the requirement that (Σ(K)∪Σ(q))\Σ(O) ⊆ NC, and a complexity analysis
of the extensions of PL obtained by adding CLASSIC’s constructs, such as number
restrictions and role-value maps.
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